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Narratives with evocative, rich details about subjective experiences
can be used to persuade people-like judges-who have sufficient
power to make a difference actually to do so....
Martha Minow'
INTRODUCTION
Since 1994, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have re-
quired federal courts to entertain in-court victim impact testimony as
part of the sentencing process. 2 However, this testimony (also known
as victim allocution) is required only in cases in which the defendant
is guilty of a crime involving violence or sexual abuse.3
This Article argues that this limitation on the ability of victims of
non-violent crimes to have access to the courts for purposes of allocu-
tion is unwise and inappropriate. Federal courts should be required
to entertain in-court victim impact testimony in cases involving non-
violent crimes as well as in cases involving violent crimes. Specifically,
in-court victim impact testimony should be required in cases involving
economic crimes such as mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud,
telemarketing fraud, and "identity theft." Victims of other federal
1 Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1689 (1990).
2 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c) (3) (E) ("[Under appropriate circumstances, the sen-
tencingjudge must] address the victim personally if the victim is present at the sen-
tencing hearing and determine if the victim wishes to make a statement or present
any information in relation to the sentence."). This provision was enacted as part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796.
3 SeeFED. R. CRmM. P. 32(c)(3) (E).
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felonies, to the extent they are clearly identifiable as victims, 4 should
also be entitled to victim allocution.
The background for this proposal is simple. Experience in eco-
nomic crime cases demonstrates that victims of these types of crimes
often feel just as violated, anxious, confused, betrayed, and depressed
as do victims of violent crimes.5 Often they are the kinds of "vulnera-
ble victims" recognized in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 6 yet they
have few resources by which to express their vulnerability or to feel
they have had a real impact on decisions relating to their victimizer's
fate.
Federal prosecutors often invite victims of economic crimes to re-
count their experiences in writing, in order to lend weight to a request
for restitution, an enhancement of the defendant's sentence, or an
upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.7 Frequently, fed-
eral judges will include specific references to these written declara-
tions in the course of the sentencing process.8 What I am proposing
in this Article involves a greater commitment to victims of non-violent
crimes, however-a legislatively-assured opportunity to be heard in
open court.9
The purpose of this proposal is three-fold: (1) to permit the vic-
tim to regain a sense of dignity and respect rather than feeling power-
less and ashamed; (2) to require defendants to confront-in person
and not just on paper-the human consequences of their illegal con-
duct; and (3) to compel courts to fully account in the sentencing pro-
cess for the serious societal harms-harms that go well beyond issues
of money-that economic crimes often impose.
The theories underlying this proposal are those that recognize
the "expressive" and "educative" functions of sentencing, in addition
to the deterrent and retributive functions. Victim allocution not only
satisfies the public's need for denunciation of offenders,' 0 but it can
4 See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
5 Some fraud victims describe their experience as "the psychological equivalent
of rape." Leslie Eaton, Assault with a Fiscal Weapon: As Swindlers Branch Out, Victims
Want To Be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at C.
6 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (1998).
7 See infra Part I.B.
8 SeeJoseph A. Slobodzian, A Phila. Lawyer Who Stole Millions Gets a 15-Year Term,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 13, 1998, at 1 (describing the collection of more than 1,000
victim impact statements compiled by federal prosecutors in connection with a $53
million insurance fraud). The sentencingjudge took specific notice of the statements
of policyholders and their heirs who had been left without health or life insurance
coverage. Id.
9 For the text of this proposal, see infra Part VI.
10 See infra Part VA
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also serve as a platform for the moral re-education of the defendant."
At the same time, permitting fraud victims to tell their stories aloud
and in public, rather than solely through the inte.rmediation of a writ-
ten document, can respond to victims' needs for restorative justice.' 2
Most importantly, though, victim allocution should materially assist
judges in reaching more appropriate sentencing decisions.
I. THE EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND FOR THIS PROPOSAL
Victims of economic crimes are always permitted to offer testi-
mony concerning a defendant's conduct, and facts supporting the ele-
ments of the crime. Courts have cautioned, however, that-at least
during the guilt phase of the prosecution-testimony having to do
with the victim's emotional reactions to the defendant's conduct may
have "little, if any, probative value and may be unfairly prejudicial." s3
Consequently, testimony that is designed "to generate feelings of sym-
pathy for the victims and outrage toward [the defendant] for reasons
not relevant to the charges"' 4 is inadmissible during the defendant's
trial on the merits. 15 Failure to distinguish between occurrence testi-
mony and victim impact testimony may lead to a reversal of a defen-
dant's criminal conviction. 16
By contrast, victim impact testimony during the penalty phase of a
trial carries no such baggage. Victim impact testimony has been held
to be relevant to sentencing issues generally and not inconsistent with
principles of due process. 17 Even in death penalty cases, and even
where the testimony is repetitive, graphic, and emotionally over-
wrought, 18 victim impact testimony is now an accepted feature on the
federal sentencing landscape.
11 See infra Part V.B.
12 See infra Part V.C.
13 United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 1996); see also United States
v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that extensive victim impact testi-
mony as to collateral losses "went beyond anything that was reasonable to prove [de-
fendant's] specific intent to defraud").
14 Copp/e, 24 F.3d at 546.
15 Typically, challenges to guilt-phase victim impact testimony are advanced
under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh,
153 F.3d 1166, 1199 (10th Cir. 1998).
16 As a practical matter, reviewing courts often find there has been no "plain
error" in admission of victim impact-type evidence or find any such error in the trial
to have been "harmless." See, e.g., id. at 1201; Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 407; Copple, 24 F.3d
at 538.
17 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
18 See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1220 (describing the intensely emotional victim impact
testimony at the defendant's sentencing hearing);James Collins, Day of Reckoning: The
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However, except in a handful of cases in which federal judges
have voluntarily entertained victim impact testimony,19 such testimony
has not been permitted in economic crime cases. That is not because
the testimony is irrelevant to the sentencing process-as will be seen
below, 20 it clearly is relevant. Rather, this exclusion of otherwise rele-
vant testimony is a function of the limits of Rule 32 (c) (3) (E).
A. The Role of the Sentencing Guidelines
Victim impact information may often be relevant in economic
crime cases to specific sentencing issues such as the length of the de-
fendant's prison term or the amount of the fine to be imposed. In
fact, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines set out a number of victim-
related issues which victim impact testimony could illuminate.
1. Upward Departures for Psychological Harms to Victims
Criminal sentencing in federal courts begins with the court deter-
mining an "offense level" for the crime, which, in economic crime
cases, is typically based on the victim's economic loss. 2 ' The resulting
sentence or fine may then be adjusted upward or downward where
certain factors are present. For example, where the victim's monetary
loss "does not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the
Jury That Found McVeigh Guilty Wrestles with Emotion and Tears as It Prepares To Decide His
Fate, TiME, June 16, 1997, at 26 (same).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Dodson, No. 99-5039, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6261, at
*16-*19 (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2000) (referring to victim testimony at sentencing as a basis
for the trial court's upward departure from the Guidelines); United States v. Luca,
183 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting victim impact testimony from some
of the defendant's victims); United States v. Van Zandt, No. 97-1622, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24472, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 1998) (citing the testimony of a victim at the
sentencing hearing); United States v. Robertson, No. 96-1233, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
690, at *9 (10th Cir.Jan. 16, 1998) (mentioning that thejudge heard victim testimony
at the sentencing hearing); United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 751 (10th Cir. 1997)
(mentioning that the district court had received some victim impact testimony at the
sentencing hearing); United States v. Akindele, 84 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 1996) (re-
counting the in-court testimony of victims); United States v. Dobish, 102 F.3d 760, 763
(6th Cir. 1996) (referring to in-court testimony of some of the defendant's victims);
United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1984) (referring to the testimony
of seven victims).
20 See infra Part I.A.
21 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAUAL § 2F1.1 (1998). For a critical exami-
nation of the mechanics of sentencing in economic crime cases, see generally Frank
0. Bowman, III, Coping with "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic
Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1998).
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[defendant's] conduct,"22 the court may depart from the Guidelines'
restrictions. Under this rubric, the prosecution may argue that the
fraud "caused or risked reasonably foreseeable, substantial non-mone-
tary harm" 23 or, more specifically, that the offense "caused reasonably
foreseeable, physical or psychological harm or severe emotional
trauma"24 in addition to monetary losses.
Some degree of emotional harm is present in most economic
crime cases. 25 But some economic crimes impose a special psycholog-
ical burden on their victims and these are the cases that warrant up-
ward departures. Using the available tools (that is, written
documentation), judges have granted upward departures based on
psychological or other non-economic harms where a telemarketer de-
frauded elderly victims, often by "badgering and insulting and degrad-
ing [them]";26 another telemarketer persuaded elderly victims to
contribute large sums to non-existent charities, often reducing them
to begging to be left alone;27 a bookkeeper defrauded dozens of small
business owners, driving some of them into states of clinical depres-
sion;28 and a neighbor defrauded his long-time neighbors, causing
them to experience a "deep sense of loss and betrayal" at his actions. 29
Other examples of foreseeable psychological harms giving rise to an
upward departure from the Guidelines include a business owner who
looted his firm's pension fund, causing his retired employees "to seek
work at an advanced age and rely on help from family members, [and
22 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Fl.1, cmt. n.1 (1998).
23 Id. § 2F1.1, cmt. n.11(a).
24 Id. § 2Fl.1, cmt. n.11(c).
25 For example, fraud victimization can often lead to self-blame, shame, guilt,
feelings of societal condemnation and indifference (the attitude that victims of fraud
deserve what they get as a result of their own greed and stupidity), and isolation
(when victims suffer their losses in silence rather than risking alienation and blame
from family members, friends, and colleagues). See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS OF FRAUD: RESOURCES FOR VICTIM/
WITNESS COORDINATORS I-1 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publi-
cations/infores/fraud/psvf.pdf. Fraud victimization can also lead to more serious
pathologies. See Linda Ganzini et al., Prevalence of Mental Disorders After Catastrophic
Financial Loss, 178J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 680, 682 (1990) (noting that 29% of
fraud victims studied suffered a "major depressive episode" following the crime).
26 See United States v. Davis, 170 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming an
eight-level upward departure).
27 See United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 751-52 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming a
two-level upward departure).
28 See United States v. Finnigan, No. 95-50248, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33991, at
*11 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996) (affirming a one-level upward departure).
29 See United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 231 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming a two-
level upward departure).
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to endure the] trauma that comes with losing one's savings"; 0 a phar-
macist who passed himself off as a physician and examined and
treated hundreds of "patients";31 a defendant convicted of identity
theft whose actions caused her victims "turmoil" and "upheaval";3 2
and a daughter who defrauded her own parents.
33
The common theme in these cases is that the victims of these
crimes not only lost significant amounts of money, they also were in-
jured in their sense of personal dignity and autonomy and, in some
cases, had their intimate relationships destroyed. Obviously, informa-
tion about these kinds of harm in an economic crime case can best be
elicited from victims, their family members, neighbors, and mental
health care providers. And the absence of an adequate record on this
issue may make an upward departure impossible.3 4
2. Upward Departures for Knowingly Endangering a Victim's
Financial Solvency
A defendant's sentence may also be adjusted upward where the
offense involved "the knowing endangerment of the solvency of one
or more victims."35 It is one thing to defraud a millionaire of $10,000
and quite another to defraud a working-class person of the same
amount. This provision of the Guidelines takes that factor into
account.
Defendants subject to this adjustment are often particularly ag-
gressive in their dealings with victims, persistent in their efforts to take
those victims' money, and singularly heedless of the import of their
actions. Thus, courts have granted upward adjustments for knowing
endangerment of financial insolvency where financial advisors caused
their clients to lose all of their money in various investment
schemes;3 6 where a greedy nephew stole his great-aunt's life savings
30 See United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming a two-
level upward departure).
31 See United States v. Barnes, 125 F.3d 1287, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming a
two-level upward departure).
32 See United States v. Sample, 213 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
a nine-month enhancement).
33 See United States v. All, No. 98-4205, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22676, at *5 (4th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1998) (affirming a two-level upward departure).
34 Sometimes, judges complain that the prosecution fails to alert the court to the
severity of victim impact. See United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1996)
("[Tihe government could have simplified matters if it had offered evidence from
some of [the defendant's] former patients.").
35 U.S. SENTENCING GumEINS MANUAL § 2FI.1, cmt. n.1I(f) (1998).
36 See United States v. Van Zandt, No. 97-1622, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24472, at *3
(2d Cir. Sept. 25, 1998) (affirming an eighteen-month upward departure where de-
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and left her "financially dependent on the generosity of others, quite
possibly for the rest of her life";37 and where a daughter misappropri-
ated her elderly parents' money, leaving them with "no income except
Social Security" and therefore condemning them to a "bleak future."38
Once again, as in the case of psychological and other non-monetary
harms, the best sources of information about the victim's financial sta-
tus prior to the crime, and the defendant's knowledge that the vic-
tim's solvency was imperiled, are the victim and others familiar with
her finances.
3. Sentence Enhancements for Targeting Vulnerable Victims
A defendant's sentence also may be adjusted upward where the
victim can be shown to have been an "unusually vulnerable" victim. 3 9
Under this rubric, the. government must first establish that the victim
was "more susceptible to abuse from [the] perpetrator than most
other potential victims of the particular offense." 40 The government
must then prove that the defendant "knew or should have known of
this susceptibility or vulnerability; and [that] this vulnerability or sus-
ceptibility facilitated the defendant's crime in some manner; that is,
there was 'a nexus between the victim's vulnerability and the crime's
ultimate success.' "41
The vulnerable victim enhancement "cannot be based solely on
the victim's memlership in a certain class; the'sentencing court is re-
quired to make particularized findings of vulnerability, focusing on
the individual victim and not the class of persons to which the victim
fendant's mail fraud cost at least two victims "all of their money" and one was "close to
losing her home"); United States v. Hogan, 121 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 1997) (af-
firming a two-level upward departure where a securities broker sold counterfeit certif-
icates of deposit to victims, knowing they were living on fixed incomes and facing
significant medical bills); United States v. Pelkey, No. 95-1008, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
15040, at *10-*11 (1st Cir. June 19, 1995) (affirming a two-level upward departure
where a financial advisor defrauded her clients even when she knew that some of
them were "right down to the last penny and she took that also"); United States v.
Strouse, 882 F. Supp. 1461, 1466-67 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (imposing a three-level upward
departure where an investment agent repeatedly solicited clients' money for his fraud-
ulent investment scheme, forcing many of them to survive solely on Social Security).
37 See United States v. Kaye, 23 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming a two-level
upward departure).
38 See Al1 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22676, at *4.
39 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3AL.1 (b)(1), cmt. n.2.
40 United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1191 (4th Cir. 1995).
41 United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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belonged."42 Obviously, this means hearing from the victim (or a fam-
ily member or others) concerning the victim's gullibility, lack of so-
phistication, confusion, dependency, or misunderstanding of the
defendant's intentions, The test is whether because of their mental or
educational deficiencies, or other reasons, "the victims are less likely
to know that they have been defrauded or if they know to have the
know-how and initiative required to press a criminal complaint or
bring a civil suit."43
Enhancements based on vulnerable victim considerations have
occurred in economic crime cases where financial advisors exploited
the confusion and anxiety of elderly clients" (or a bewildered young
widow) ;45 where a con man preyed on a Vietnam veteran who wrongly
believed him to he a "brother-in-arms"; 46 where a caregiver stole the
savings of her client, an eighty-seven-year-old woman who, for the pre-
ceding three years had been "completely reliant on [the defendant]
for her care"; 47 and where the defendant extorted money from a re-
cent immigrant, persuading him that the money was necessary to pay
off the police in order to avoid deportation.48
Vulnerable victim adjustments also have been made where loan
brokers extorted advance loan fees from people with poor credit rat-
ings who were desperate for cash;49 where telemarketers preyed on
"mooches" (people who had previously been victims of telemarketing
frauds) ;50 and where insurance salesmen collected premiums for non-
existent policies from people with uninsurable medical conditions.51
Homeless people, 52 people with poor credit ratings,53 and persons
42 United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 749 (10th Cir. 1997).
43 United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1999).
44 See Smith, 133 F.3d at 749 (affirming a two-level enhancement).
45 See United States v. Giesse, No. 98-8027, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3812, at
*10-*11 (10th Gir. Mar. 10, 1999) (affirming a two-level enhancement).
46 See lannone, 184 F.3d at 221 (affirming a two-level enhancement).
47 See United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming a two-
level enhancement).
48 See United States v. Bengali, 11 F.3d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming a
two-level enhancement).
49 See United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Gir. 1999) (affirming en-
hancement of sentence to sixty-three months); United States v. Page, 69 F.3d 482, 492
(11th Cir. 1995) (affirming a two-level enhancement).
50 See United States v. Coffinan, No. 97-5219, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16912 (10th
Cir. July 23, 1998) (affirming a two-level enhancement),
51 See United States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming a two-level
enhancement).
52 See United States v. Bragg, 207 F.3d 394, 400-02 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming a
two-level enhancement).
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with mental deficiencies54 have all been found to be unusually vulner-
able victims.
In each of these cases, the finding that a victim is "unusually vul-
nerable" has been based on paper submissions. Persuading judges to
appreciate the vulnerability of a particular victim, though, may often
depend on their opportunity to observe the victim's demeanor, listen
to the victim's narration of his experiences, and assess the victim's
ability to resist the defendant's inducements. This is where victim al-
locution could greatly assist the court.
4. Sentence Enhancements for Abuse of Trust
A defendant's sentence may also be adjusted upward where the
defendant can be shown to have "abused a position of public or pri-
vate trust."5 5 Under this rubric, the government may argue that the
victim's particular relationship to the defendant "contributed in some
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the
offense. '56 Positions of trust are not limited to traditional fiducia-
ries.5 7 But "reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the posi-
tion" is an essential element of the position of trust analysis.58
"There are two indicia of [a] position of trust: (1) 'the inability of
the trustor objectively and expediently to determine the trustee's hon-
esty' and (2) 'the ease [or difficulty] with which the trustee's activities
can be observed.'"9 Both involve fact-specific inquiries 6 and both
may be established by victim impact evidence. 61 Upward adjustments
based on abuse of trust considerations have occurred in economic
crime cases where lawyers62 or financial advisors65 defrauded their cli-
53 See United States v. Borst, 62 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming a two-level
enhancement); United States v. Holmes, 60 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1995) (af-
firming a three-level enhancement); United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 1410, 1416-18
(9th Cir. 1992) (affirming a two-level enhancement for both defendants).
54 See United States v. Gabrion, No. 98-1822, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18740, at
*18-*21 (6th Cir. July 27, 2000) (affirming a two-level enhancement).
55 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 3B1.3 (1998).
56 Id. cmt. n.1; United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (6th Cir. 1993).
57 See United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1999).
58 See id.
59 United States v. Velez, 185 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)).
60 See United States v. Baker, 200 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 2000).
61 See United States v. Cusack, 66 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting
that "whether a position is one of trust 'is to be viewed from the perspective of the
offense victims'") (quoting United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 195 (2d Cir. 1999)).
62 See United States v. Holmes, 193 F.3d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
lawyer who misappropriated funds from several clients had abused his position of
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ents; a key employee embezzled from her employer;64 a law firm
paralegal misappropriated client documents in a forgery-and-fraud
scheme;65 a school administrator misappropriated school operating
funds for his personal use;66 and a real estate agent used his clients'
social security numbers and other personal information from their
files to fraudulently secure credit cards. 67 As in the case of unusually
vulnerable victims, the evidence necessary to support an abuse of trust
enhancement will best come from the victim(s) or their associates,
and in-court testimony may prove the most effective way to establish
the veracity of claims of a trust-type relationship.
5. Departures from the Guidelines for Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances
Finally, a sentence may be calculated so as to depart from the
Guidelines where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into considera-
tion by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines
that should result in a sentence different from that described [in the
Guidelines] *"68 A departure under this provision may only be granted
where the crime is so different in kind or effect from a "typical" crime
of its type that it "fall[s] outside the heartland of cases in the
Guidelines. '69
Establishing the "heartland" and defining its boundaries usually
involves proof that the defendant defrauded more than some "typical"
number of victim, 70 or dealt with his victims in a way that is particu-
trust, and to such an extraordinary degree that an upward departure-on top of the
two-level sentence enhancement-was warranted).
63 See Baker, 200 F.3d at 563-64 (holding that an insurance agent who received
premium payments from her elderly clients, then misappropriated them for her own
personal use, abused her position of trust); United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343,
1355 (10th Cir. 1998) (same).
64 See United States v. Allen, 201 F.3d 163, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming a
two-level enhancement).
65 See Cusack, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 497-98 (imposing a two-level enhancement).
66 See United States v. Robinson, 198 F.3d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming a
two-level enhancement).
67 See United States v. Alinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming a
two-level enhancement).
68 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1998).
69 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 1999) (af-
firming upward departure where district court considered the large number of vic-
tims defrauded).
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larly degrading, offensive, or cruel.71 Upward departures based on
aggravating circumstances specifically related to economic crime vic-
tims have occurred where the defendant, an employee of a children's
hospital, misappropriated the social security numbers of 135 of the
hospital's patients and used them in an elaborate credit card scam; 72
the defendant defrauded 336 elderly victims-sometimes repeat-
edly-in a telemarketing scheme;73 the defendant defrauded more
than 600 investors in twenty-two states in a Ponzi scheme;74 the defen-
dant paid his accomplices in drugs, rather than cash, for each stolen
credit card they delivered to him;75 the defendant defrauded real es-
tate buyers, sellers, lending institutions, and title insurance companies
in an elaborate scheme that played out over seven years;76 and the
defendant forged her mother's signature on dozens of checks in a
scheme to defraud her mother's employer.77 Defendants "without
scruples,"78 and those "who would sacrifice any person or institution
in the service of [their] greed, ' 79 may be subject to these sorts of up-
ward departures. So may defendants whose crimes strike the court as
"despicable,"80 those who show no remorse for their crimes, 81 and
those whose crimes are "extraordinarily shocking to the public con-
71 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.8 (authorizing upward depar-
ture where defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to
the victim).
72 See Melvin, 187 F.3d at 1319 (affirming a fifteen-level upward departure).
73 See United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 486 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming a two-
level upward departure).
74 See United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming a
twenty-seven month upward departure).
75 See United States v. Johnson, No. 95-5414, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7588, at *5
(4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1997) (affirming a one-level upward departure).
76 See United States v. Conklin, No. 97-1813, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31975, at *5
(6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998) (affirming a seven month upward departure).
77 See United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming a seven-level
upward departure).
78 See United States v. Cusack, 66 F. Supp. 2d 493, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (imposing
a one-level upward departure).
79 See id.
80 See United States v. Robertson, No. 96-1233, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 690, at *9
(10th Cir.Jan 16, 1998) (affirming a two-level upward departure where the defendant
solicited money from elderly victims by telling them their money Was to be used to
keep children off drugs-only $45 out of $915,000 collected went to charity).
81 See United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 486-87 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming a
three-level upward departure where the defendant led a telemarketing scheme that
solicited funds from elderly victims by telling them they had won a "fabulous prize").
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science."8 2 In these sorts of cases, the number and nature of the vic-
tims, the manipulative ways in which the defendants interacted with
them, and the totality of the impact of the crime on society can best
be elicited by victim impact testimony.
B. The Common Use of Written Comments
Using the various victim-centered provisions of the Guidelines,
courts in economic crime cases have frequently considered written
victim impact statements and used them as an element in deter-
mining a defendant's sentence. The documents relied on have in-
cluded direct communications to the court,83 written victim inpact
statements appended to the pre-sentence investigation report
(PSIR),84 summaries of victim interviews by U.S. Probation Service
personnel,85 affidavits prepared for submission at the sentencing, 6
and various forms of supporting documentation.8 7 Written victim
82 See United States v. Moskal, 211 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming a
three-level upward departure where the defendant, a noted personal injury attorney,
stole $2.4 million from clients, referring attorneys, and his own law firm).
83 See United States v. Van Zandt, No. 97-1622, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24472, at *3
(2d Cir. Sept. 25, 1998) (victims' letters to the court); United States v. Barnes, 125
F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Finnigan, Nos. 95-50248, 95-
50251, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33991, at *10 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996) (same); United
States v. Wells, 101 F.3d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Dobish, 102
F.3d 760, 763 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Hoffenberg, No. 94-CR213,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2394, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1997) (sentencing opinion) (re-
counting the "hundreds of letters detailing the devastating economic, psychological,
and even physical effects of [the defendant's] successful scheme to defraud"); United
States v. Skodnek, 933 F. Supp. 1108, 1121 n.31 (D. Mass. 1996) (referring to victims'
letters to the court).
There is no prohibition against courts considering letters from victims. See Reid
v. State, 490 A.2d 1289, 1294 (Md. 1985) (holding that it does not violate a defen-
dant's due process rights for the sentencing judge to receive and consider informa-
tion sent directly to him by the victim). But see United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389,
392-95 (6th Cir. 1999) (vacating a sentence where the judge considered victims' let-
ters to the court without giving notice of same to the defendant).
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (1994) (describing the PSIR process). These statements
may include a detailed history of the victims' losses, including psychological harms,
disruptions to their lives, and loss of income and property. See United States v. Rezaq,
134 F.3d 1121, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
85 See Finnigan, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33991, at *10.
86 See United States v. Pelkey, No. 95-1008, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15040, at *10
(1st Cir. June 19, 1995) (noting use of victims' affidavits at sentencing).
87 For example, written victim impact statements may include corroborating
materials from physicians, psychiatrists, and employers. See Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1141.
Occasionally, psychologists are also permitted to testify regarding victim impact it the
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impact documentation is required to support an order of restitu-
tion.88
II. A SAMPLING OF THE VOICES OF VICTIMS OF NON-VIOLENT CRIMES
Victims of economic crimes are currently afforded a limited
range of options when it comes to communicating their stories. They
are, of course, permitted to submit written forms of victim impact evi-
dence, as noted above. But many victims of economic crimes have
found that option to be inadequate and have sought other avenues to
express their opinions and feelings about the crime and the offender.
Thus, victims of economic crimes, like victims of violent crimes, are
sometimes found demonstrating outside of the courthouse,8 9 packing
the seats at the defendant's trial or sentencing, 90 writing impassioned
letters to the editor, or making their cases to sympathetic reporters. A
few try physical violence against their victimizers91-others commit su-
icide.92 The need to be heard, to describe the events leading up to
the crime, and to develop some sense that their listeners can truly
grasp the depth of their loss, is obviously a compelling one for many
economic crime victims.93
sentencing hearing. See United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1992)
(describing the testimony of the victim's treating psychologist).
88 See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) (2) (A) (vi) (Supp. 2000); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b) (4) (D).
89 SeeJohn Rothchild, A Wonderful Life, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at Book Review
10 (book review) (incorporating a photograph of elderly picketers in front of the Los
Angeles Criminal Courts Building protesting against Charles Keating).
90 See Tom Lowry, Stockbroker Convicted in Laundering Scheme Scam Left 550 Investors
with $8.6 M in Losses, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 23, 1998, at 8B (noting the attendance of
forty of the defendant's victims at the sentencing hearing). As the defendant walked
into the hearing, one victim was heard to shout, "Slither into the courtroom, you rat."
Id.
91 During the trial of Charles Keating for securities fraud, two of Keating's elderly
victims attacked him physically in the courtroom. SeeJoe Morgenstem, Profit Without
Honor, PLAYBOY, Apr. 1992, at 68.
92 According to the Lincoln/ACC Bondholders Action Committee, seven of Keat-
ing's victims committed suicide. See Ted Johnson & Anne Michaud, Buyers of Bonds
Remain Bitter, Unsatisfied, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1992, at Al.
93 See Gordon Bazemore, Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption, 41 AM. BEHAV.
SCIEiNTsT 768, 783 (1998).
I can tell you that what most victims want most is quite unrelated to the law.
It amounts more than anything else to three things: victims need to have
people recognize how much trauma they've been through.... They need to
express that, and have it expressed to them; they want to find out what kind
of person could have done such a thing, and why to them; and it really helps
to hear that the offender is sorry-or that someone is sorry on his or her
behalf.
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But what are their stories? Are they all about money? About
shame? About vengeance? About loss of faith in others? The range
of emotions, and the variety of victims' experiences, are at best merely
hinted at in most written court records. Still, the experiences of vic-
tims of economic crimes, even when confined to the written page and
even when they are merely summarized by the sentencing judge, are
undeniably gripping.
In sentencing a defendant convicted of securities fraud, for exam-
ple, one sentencing judge noted:
The correspondence received by the Court details again and again
the effects on working people, the elderly, the disabled, single par-
ents and their children, and police officers and firefighters whose
lives were forever altered when their life savings, retirement and col-
lege funds were destroyed as a consequence of [the defendant's]
acts.9
4
In another securities fraud case, the court of appeals noted:
Trial testimony indicated [the defendant] would ingratiate himself
to victims in order to ascertain the extent of their financial re-
sources. [The defendant] would then take everything he could get,
going so far as to take one victim's last dollar. When victims indi-
cated there was no more money, [the defendant] continued to call,
proud of the fact these people were "mooches" who could be
preyed on again and again. As a result of [the defendant's] con-
duct, victims lost all their savings. One victim, an 83 year-old widow,
was forced to mow lawns and clean motel rooms to get by. [The
defendant's] victims also were psychologically and emotionally
harmed, suffering from depression and loss of self-esteem.95
In a "theft of identity" case involving the unauthorized use of
credit cards and related acts of mail fraud, the sentencing judge took
particular note of two of the victims' experiences:
Id. (quoting a victim).'
94 United States v. Hoffenberg, No. 94-CR213, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2394, at *38
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1997).
95 United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 751 (10th Cir. 1997). In a similar case,
the sentencing judge noted that the victims in the case had "suffered mental strain
and emotional anxiety," "become physically sick and [had to take] anti-depression
and anxiety medication," one lost her home, and "many of the victims lost their life
savings on which they planned to live for the rest of their lives." United States v.
Strouse, 882 F. Supp. 1461, 1464-65 (M.D. Pa. 1995). In yet another case, the court
noted that the fraud had "caused a range of stress, depression, and stress-related phys-
ical ailments" among the victims. United States v. Finnigan, Nos. 95-50248, 95-50251,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33991, at *11 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996).
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The thing that impresses me is not just the misuse of the credit
cards, but the description by each one of the victims about the tre-
mendous amount of time and energy that they had to devote to
getting their credit cleared up, the embarrassment which they suf-
fered from stores, collection agencies, being turned down for
credit, having to produce identification, having to carry--having to
pay cash.
[T]he [victims] whose identity [the defendant] assumed lost days
from work, feared arrest, were forced to appear in court, struggled
to repair their credit rating, were not able to use the credit cards in
their possession, and still face problems connected with this
offense. 96
In another credit card fraud case, the sentencing judge observed:
[I] t is an enduring victimization in that the persons subjected to it
may never totally recover because it is true that once your name is
sullied, it's very difficult to get everyone in the world to believe [the
truth] . . . and you are then subject continually all your life to the
possibility of being blindsided, although now you might know where
it originated, you don't know how it has proliferated.... If you will,
it's like having adult chicken pox and always wondering whether
you're going to get shingles. 97
These passages, however compelling, only reflect the translation
of the victims' stories into the rarified language of the judge who has
recounted them. The language of the victims themselves is something
else altogether.98 Consider the comments of elderly churchgoers,
who were defrauded by their pastor's son and who submitted their
comments (in writing) to a state court in Florida:
This was someone that I trusted and knew.., my husband has had
to try and accept he may have lost his total retirement. This was all
the money we had left.
My reaction to this atrocity is devastating. My husband died believ-
ing that the money ... he left invested with Dan Strader... had left
me financially able to take care of myself ... for the rest of my
96 United States v. Wells, 101 F.3d 370, 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1996).
97 United States v. Akindele, 84 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting the sen-
tencing judge).
98 Anthony Alfieri has made this point in the context of Legal Services. There,
lawyers must constantly guard against displacing client narratives with lawyer narra-
tives. "The different voices of client narratives imbue client story with normative
meanings.... When the client's voices are silenced and her narratives are displaced
by the lawyer's narratives, client integrity is tarnished and client story is losL"
Anthony V. Alfieri, Essay, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2119 (1991).
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life.... I am now emotionally and financially ruined. I am living
on my Social Security and had to go out and find ajob and return
to work at the age of 70 years.
I have no one to help me and no money to hire help like I did
before . . . we cannot buy the medicine that we need because of
this ... I would get ajob ifI had someone to stay with my wife... At
the time this happened my wife was on a new drug for this problem
and I had to quit it because she or we could not afford it any longer.
Our granddaughter has been very sick for a long, extended time...
We were using the interest that Daniel Strader guaranteed to pay
her bills until she could go back to work. My granddaughter be-
came permanently disabled so we decided to get our money from
Mr. Strader to pay off her home. We never received our money, so
they are foreclosing on her home, and she has no way of supporting
herself. We only receive $573 in Social Security payments to live on.
This has made me depressed and I have lost trust in anyone.
I am 75 years old and will be long gone before I receive any amount
that he owes me. In the mean time, I live day to day worrying about
finances.
It has made me feel betrayed not only by the business community
but also by the Christian community in which Mr. Daniel Strader is
held in such high regard.
Mr. Strader has preyed on the trusting, the needy, the vulnerable,
and elderly. We were gullible to trust his suave line of lies and de-
ceptive innuendos. His deceit and cunning were well planned and
he exploited all of us without any human conscience...
I was a victim of being a sad, lonely, widow.99
Or consider the comments of a victim of another fraud scheme,
also involving members of the defendant's close-knit church:
[The defendant] skillfully manipulated my faith in God to his ad-
vantage, looking in me in the eye while praying .to God to bless the
investment, all the while stealing my life savings .... To summarize,
Luca is an expert at using people's faith in God as a means of get-
ting to their savings, reaching through their souls to pick their pock-
ets, taking not only their savings but also their faith. 10 0
Or consider the testimony of two victims of an identity theft:
I've had two missed days off [sic] work trying to get different
problems straightened out, and the frustration of the many phone
calls that I've had to deal with while I've been at work that relate to
this case has been overwhelming and distracting. I'm an elementary
99 Judge Outlines Strader's Lies, Deceit LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Aug. 10, 1995, at 3B
(original punctuation retained).
100 United States v. Luca, 183 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting the vic-
tim's letter).
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school teacher, and it has been extremely difficult for me to deal
with these phone calls and then immediately step back into my
classroom emotionally ready to meet the educational needs of my
students.
I cannot even begin to explain the embarrassment and the humilia-
tion that I feel when I'm rejected [sic] credit or when stores refuse
to accept my checks because of the criminal actions of Ms. Sample.
Try to imagine how demoralizing it is to be treated like a criminal
for a crime committed against you. Emotionally, it's very
degrading.10 1
Two features characterize these written first-person reports: they
are tendered in the victims' own-sometimes colorful and sometimes
awkward-language, and they often express intense, and intimate,
emotions. The best of them are painful to read, sometimes surprising,
but always recognizable as a genuine human experience. The worst of
the victim impact statements are obsessive, vindictive, and frankly
unappealing.
In either case, though, first-person evidence can be instructive.
"Research shows that legal professionals who have been exposed to
[victims' stories] have commented on how uninformed they were
about the extent, variety and longevity of various victimisations [sic],
and how much they have learned from [victim impact state-
ments] .. ."102 It is this process of direct communication between
the victim and the decisionmaker that underlies the proposal for vic-
tim allocution.
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR VICTIM ALLOCUTION
Economic crimes now represent over twenty percent of the fed-
eral courts' criminal dockets.10 3 And-unlike violent crimes-the
101 United States v. Sample, 213 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000).
102 Edna Erez, Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim
Empowerment and Enhancement ofJustice, 1999 CRIM. L. REv. 545, 554.
103 See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTIcE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1998, at 53 tbl.4.1 (2000) ("Defendants in cases commenced, by
offense, from October 1, 1997 - September 30, 1998."), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfs98.pdf. This figure is composed of fraud of-
fenses (15.9% of the total), racketeering and extortion (1.5% of the total), and "regu-
latory offenses" (1.7% of the total). It does not include misdemeanors. By
comparison, drug offenses represent 35.8% of the federal court caseload. Id.
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number of economic crimes have been increasing in recent years.10 4
This is especially true of economic crimes involving the Internet.10 5
The victims of these crimes now represent a substantial cross-sec-
tion of the American population. (As a practical matter, nearly two-
thirds of adult Americans have been'victimized by some form of fraud
scheme.) 106 Many of these victims are indifferent to allocution issues,
of course, but many others of them are clamoring for the courts' at-
tention. 10 7 They question their exclusion from victims' rights protec-
tions, 08 and they want their stories to be heard. There are a number
of reasons why their concerns should give rise to an amendment of
Rule 32(c) (3) (E).
A. A Rule That Privileges Victims of Violent Crimes and Excludes Victims
of Non-Violent Crimes Is Unsound
One argument to be made in favor of victim allocution in eco-
nomic crime cases is that the current situation-in which victims of
violent crimes are entitled to be heard in court while victims of other
federal felonies are not entitled to be heard-makes little principled
sense. The existing limitation may be a function of legislative triage
(in which those victims whose circumstances seemed .most compel-
ling-or whose advocacy was the most politically appealing-were ad-
dressed first). Or, it may be a matter of resource conservation.
104 SeeJayson Blair, In a Side Effect of Economic Prosperity, White-Collar OimeFlourishes,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at B1 (reporting that while violent crime has "plummeted"
nationwide, white-collar crime has "skyrocketed").
105 See Complaints Soar About On-Line Fraud, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1999, at D2
(reporting that the number of consumers complaining that they were defrauded in
an Internet transaction had increased from 1,280 in 1997 to 7,752 in 1998); Frank
James, Scam Artists on Internet Warned of Big Crackdown, CHI. Twm., Mar. 24, 2000, § 1, at
4 (reporting that a multinational law enforcement team recently identified 1,600 sites
"pitching scams over the Web"); Peter Lewis, Police Finally Probe Scam on E-Bay, SATrTLE
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at E2 (reporting that in the first half of 1999 the FTC's Bureau
of Consumer Protection received about 6000 complaints involving online auction
fraud as compared with about 300 during the same period in 1998); Timothy L.
O'Brien, Offwials Worried over a Sharp Rise in Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at
Al (reporting on the increasing misuse of Social Security numbers, often involving
purchases over the Internet).
106 See Richard Titus et al., The Anatomy of Fraud: Report of a Nationwide Survey,
NAT'L INST. oFJusT.J., Aug. 1995, at 28 (noting that close to 60% of American adults
have been the victims of fraud), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/nijj_229.pdf.
107 See Eaton, supra note 5.
108 For example, the most recent iteration of a victims' rights constitutional
amendment at the federal level only applied to victims of violent crime. See S. Res. 3,
106th Cong. (1999) (introduced by Senators Kyl and Feinstein).
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(Barely 5% of federal prosecutions involve violent crimes.) 10 9 Or, it
may be a function of institutional racism.110 Whatever its origin, the
legal distinction between violent and non-violent crimes is
problematic.
First, it is not necessarily true that violent crimes have a greater
impact on a victim's sense of personal autonomy or well-being than
other crimes. This may often be true, but is often not true in individ-
ual cases. Thus, some violent crimes have only a passing impact on
some victims. And some economic crimes may have a devastating im-
pact on other victims. Consider the argument of Senator Orrin Hatch
(R-Utah), in response to the proposed Victims' Rights Constitutional
Amendment, which provided protections to victims of violent crimes
but not to victims of non-violent crimes:
I believe we must tread carefully when assigning constitutional
rights on the arbitrary basis of whether the legislature has classified
a particular crime as "violent" or "non-violent." Consider, for exam-
ple, the relative losses of two victims. First, consider the plight of an
elderly woman who is victimized by a fraudulent investment scheme
and loses her life's savings. Second, think of a college student who
happens to take a punch during a bar fight which leaves him with a
black eye for a couple days. I do not believe it to be clear that one
of these victims is more deserving of constitutional protection than
the other."'
Similar arguments are obvious. Some victims of a federal eco-
nomic crime such as mail fraud (especially where they are "unusually
vulnerable victims" or the victims of an abuse of trust) may suffer
much more than, say, a victim who is assaulted while camping on fed-
eral lands. 1 2 But, under current law, only the latter will be permitted
to offer victim impact testimony at the defendant's sentencing.
109 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 53
tbl.4.1 (reporting that violent offenses represented only 4.8% of the criminal cases
prosecuted in federal courts during 1998).
110 Thanks to John Levy for making this point. Certainly, in the federal system, as
elsewhere, violent crimes are more likely to be committed by persons of color than by
whites. Conversely, white collar crimes are more likely to be committed by whites
than by persons of color. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES:
WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL COURTS 71 (1991) (discussing demographic
characteristics of offenders which show whites constitute 77.9% of white-collar
criminals, while the percentage of non-whites is more than twice that of whites in
common street crimes).
111 See S. REP. No. 105-409, at 42 (1998) (Sen. Orrin Hatch, proposing an amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States to protect the rights of crime victims).
112 In the civil context juries have long understood this distinction. For example,
juries in defamation cases, invasion of privacy cases, and intentional infliction of emo-
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And while Hatch's argument is persuasive on its own, Sissela Bok
makes an even stronger argument-that in many ways (from the vic-
tim's perspective) fraud is a form of interpersonal abuse that, al-
though not physical, may be even more insidious:
Deceit and violence-these are the two forms of deliberate assault
on human beings. Both can coerce people into acting against their
will. Most harm that can befall victims through violence can come
to them also through deceit. But deceit controls more subtly, for it
works on belief as well as action.113
In other words, neither the quality of a victim's suffering nor the
perfidy of the offender bears any relationship to whether the crime
committed was violent or non-violent. Such a distinction is arbitrary
and offers no useful justification for Rule 32 (c) (3) (E).
Paul Cassell argues that the distinction between violent and non-
violent crimes is historical and that it "follows in a long line of state
[victims' rights] amendments" that exclude victims of non-violent
crimes.114 In fact, Cassell can point to only one state constitutional
victims' rights amendment that expressly excludes victims of non-vio-
lent crimes.115 A handful of other states have elected to exclude these
victims from victims' rights provisions statutorily.116 What is impor-
tional harm cases often award damages at a much higher rate than would be appro-
priate in a simple slip-and-fall case or a routine medical malpractice case. See, e.g.,
Weller v. Am. Broad. Co., 232 Cal. App. 3d 991 (Ct. App. 1991) (awarding $1 million
for infliction of emotional harm); Almog v. Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 689 A.2d
158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (affirming award of $525,000 for injury to reputa-
tion, plus $4.5 million in punitive damages/in a libel case); Household Credit Servs.,
Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App. 1998) (approving an award of $450,000 in
actual damages and $1.25 million in punitive damages in an invasion of privacy case).
113 SissELA BOK, LuNC: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRiVATE LIFE 18 (1989).
114 See Protecting the Rights of Crime Victims: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
23-26 (1999) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Professor of Law, on behalf of the Na-
tional Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network) [hereinafter Hearing].
115 See N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 24. This victims' rights amendment is limited to vic-
tims of
arson resulting in bodily injury, aggravated arson, aggravated assault, aggra-
vated battery, dangerous use of explosives, negligent use of a deadly weapon,
murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual contact of a minor, homicide by
vehicle, great bodily injury by vehicle or abandonment or abuse of a child or
that victim's representative ....
Id.
116 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-302 (West 2001) (victims' rights provi-
sions applicable only in cases of murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, assault,
menacing, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, incest, child abuse, sexual exploitation
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tant to note, though, is that a vastly larger collection of state victims'
rights provisions specifically include victims of non-violent as well as
violent crimes in their coverage. As of now, nearly half the states re-
quire their courts to hear live victim impact testimony-as well as to
consider written victim impact statements-in economic felonies and
other non-violent crime cases.1 17
of children, crimes against at-risk adults or at-risk juveniles, acts of domestic violence,
stalking, ethnic intimidation, careless driving that results in the death of another per-
son, and failure to stop at the scene of an accidenf where the accident results in the
death of another person); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-17-3 (1997) (victims' rights provisions
applicable only in cases of "crimes against persons," sexual offenses, theft and armed
robbery, sexual exploitation of children, homicide by vehicle, feticide by vehicle, or
serious injury by vehicle); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306 (Michie 2001) (victims' rights provi-
sions applicable only to crimes involving physical injury, threat of physical injury, or
sexual assault); TEX. CODE GRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.01 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (victims'
rights provisions applicable only to victims of sexual assault, kidnapping, aggravated
robbery, or crimes involving bodily injury or death).
117 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-72 (1995) (allowing victims to be heard at any sen-
tencing proceeding); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.023(b) (Michie 2000) (allowing for sworn
victim impact testimony or an unsworn victim presentation at sentencing); Amiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-702(E) (West 2001) (requiring the court to consider victim impact
testimony at an aggravation or mitigation proceeding); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1
(West Supp. 2001) (permitting victim to appear and reasonably present views con-
cerning the crime, the person responsible, and the need for restitution); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 679.02 (a) (3) (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91c.(b) (West Supp.
2001) (permitting testimony of victim of a class A, B, or C felony concerning the facts
of the case, the appropriateness of any penalty and the extent of any injuries, finan-
cial losses, and loss of earnings directly resulting from the crime); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.143(2) (a) (West 2001) (permitting victim impact testimony at sentencing, lim-
ited to the facts of the case, the extent of any harm, and "any matter relevant to an
appropriate disposition of the case"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (1997) (permitting
victim impact testimony in the discretion of the sentencing judge, with limitations as
to subject matter); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-604(3) (Michie 1999) (permitting vic-
tim impact testimony at sentencing); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-3-5(b) (Michie 1998)
(same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.21 (West Supp. 2001) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1844K (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1174
(West Supp. 2000) (same); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 4B (Law. Co-op. 1992 & Supp.
2001) (same); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 780.765 (West 1998) (same); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.038(a) (West Supp. 2001) (same-subject to "reasonable limitations as
to time and length"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.015(3) (Michie 2001) (permitting
testimony of a victim concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the
crime on the victim, and the need for restitution); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.11 (West
1990) (permitting victims to submit an oral statement to be considered in deciding
sentencing terms); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4(G) (Michie 2000) (permitting victim
impact testimony at sentencing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.19 (Anderson 1999 &
Supp. 2001) (same); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-28-3(11) (1998) (permitting victim impact
testimony at sentencing where the defendant was found guilty following a trial); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000) (permitting victim impact testi-
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In addition to the rules set out in state law, moreover, federal law
traditionally has not distinguished between violent crimes and non-
violent crimes. For example, there is no legal difference between
violent crimes and non-violent crimes when it comes to the right
to jury trial,1 18 the right to speedy trial, n 9 the right to confront
witnesses, 120 the right to assistance of counsel,12' the right to avoid
double jeopardy,1 22 the right to be excused from self-incrimination, 123
or the right to defendant allocution.124 Nor is there any such distinc-
tion in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, save for Rule
32(c) (3) (E). 125
In short, there is no obvious correlation between the fact of vio-
lence and the fact (or magnitude) of social harm. It therefore does
not make sense to have a rule governing sentencing procedures in
felony cases involving physical violence that differs in significant ways
from the rule governing sentencing procedures in non-violent felony
cases.
B. Requiring That Victim Impact Testimony Be Heard in Open Court Will
Materially Assist the Sentencing Judge in Determining an
Appropriate Sentence
There is a second, even more compelling, reason why victim allo-
cution should be required in economic crime cases. Simply stated,
written victim impact evidence is not as useful as spoken, narrative vic-
mony at sentencing); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-28G-1(8) (Michie 1998) (same);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-4(7) (1999) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006(a) (2)
(1998) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.110 (West Supp. 2001) (permitting
victims to make "arguments" at sentencing); W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-2(b) (1997) (per-
mitting victim impact testimony at sentencing); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.14(3) (a) (West
1998) (same); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-21-102 (Michie 2001) (same).
118 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
119 See id. amend. VI.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id. amend. V.
123 See id.
124 See FED. R. CraM. P. 32(c) (3) (C) (providing that the court must personally ad-
dress the defendant, inquiring into the defendant's wish to speak on his behalf).
125 Similarly, the law in civil cases makes no categorical distinction between violent
and non-violent conduct. For example, neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
nor the Federal Rules of Evidence treat violent (or "bodily") torts any differently than
dignitary torts. The remedies may differ (as the sanctions may differ in criminal cases
based on the gravity of the crime), but the process of adjudication does not differ
merely because violence is involved.
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tim impact evidence and judges can benefit from the presence of vic-
tims in the courtroom.
The utility of a victim's own words, inflections, and gestures-as
opposed to a written statement or a summary by others-lies partly in
the fact that court officials-and judges especially--often become de-
sensitized to the pain that victims of a crime may feel. Judges often
develop an inherent sense of the "normal" degree of suffering a "nor-
mal" victim should experience.1 26 This may be based on their own
experiences and preconceptions about crimes 127 and may not reflect
the true impact of a crime on a specific victim. Moreover, over time,
some judges may lose their outrage about crimes in general or about
specific crimes 128 and may come to regard them-especially economic
crimes-as routine and unexceptional, and unworthy of their special
attention.
Often, for example, fraud can be reduced to a caricature of a
victim who is greedy, a defendant who is clever, and a transfer of
money from one unworthy hand to another. Identity theft is easy to
minimize-why doesn't the victim simply get a new set of credit cards?
Indeed, why didn't the victim of a securities scam think twice before
investing his savings in a company of which he learned over the In-
ternet? How stupid could he have been?
Even the grossest of frauds-the fleecing of clients with limited
education or the exploitation of the elderly or infirm-can involve the
court in a complex review of hundreds of documents that leaves the
judge fatigued at the point of handing down a sentence. Differentiat-
ing among these burdensome cases, identifying those defendants who
are deserving of enhanced punishment, calculating an appropriate
sanction, and writing a reversal-proof sentencing opinion, can some-
times simply seem like a chore. As a practical matter, determining an
appropriate sentence for a defendant may not be the most rewarding
work a federal judge (or her clerk) is called upon to perform.
Personalized victim impact statements-especially those high-
lighting the intimate details of loss, pain, and recovery-can break
through this barrier of contempt, familiarity, and ennui. 29 This is
126 See Edna Erez & Linda Rogers, Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing Outcomes
and Processes: The Perspectives of Legal Professionals, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 216, 224
(1999) (recounting interviews with judges and lawyers).
127 See Erez, supra note 102, at 554.
128 See Erez & Rogers, supra note 126, at 225.
129 Martha Minow makes a related point when writing about the power of a vic-
tim's personal narrative to break through the complacency of family court judges, in
the context of spousal and child abuse. See Minow, supra note 1, at 1689.
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true even of written victim impact statements. 30 It is even more true
of statements made orally, in the presence of the court, and especially
true of statements made without prior scripting.
Even if a statement is rehearsed, however (as may be desirable as
will be seen below),' 3 ' spoken testimony-as compared to a written
victim impact statement-can engage the listener in a totally different
way than reading a printed document possibly could. 32 Thus, courts
routinely now allow the testimony of absent witnesses to be presented
by videotape rather than by written deposition, and experienced trial
lawyers spend large sums of money to present key testimony in that
form, solely because of its greater impact on the factfinder 33 (Simi-
larly, no lawyer who has participated in an administrative proceeding
where the direct testimony is presented in writing can doubt the dif-
ference between that form of "testimony" and testimony from a live
witness.)
It is because oral testimony is so much more powerful than
equivalent evidence in writing that, in one Maryland case, the court of
appeals (the state's highest court) directed trial judges who might oth-
erwise rely solely on written victim impact statements, to "accept vic-
tim impact testimony wherever possible."'13 4 And it is why some
130 See Erez, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
131 See infra Part V.E.
132 See Dennis O'Brien, Riding Supports Victim Testimony at Sentencing, BALT. SUN,
June 7, 1995, at 1B ("It's easy to read a statement and brush it off, but to hear some-
one's voice when they talk about the emotional toll of [a crime], it's a lot harder to
put that out of your mind.") (quoting prosecutor); see also Paul Gewirtz, Victims and
Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Tria in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN Tm LA.W 135, 146-47 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
A VIS [victim impact statement] document can be shaped, structured, and
polished to produce a desired effect. It also has the imprimatur of the
"state" as author and therefore arguably gains narrative authority.... But, as
a written document that is read, it will not have the human immediacy of live
testimony from the victims' survivors, which allows their sadness and suffer-
ing to be observed, not just explained.
Id.
133 See Michael J. Henke & Craig D. Margolis, The Taking and Use of Video Deposi-
tions: An Update, 17 REV. LIG. 1, 14 (1998) (stating that a video deposition is "a
superior method of conveying to the fact finder the full message of the witness")
(quoting Riley v. Murdock, 156 F.R.D. 130, 131 (E.D.N.C. 1994)); Gregory T. Jones,
Lex, Lies & Videotape, 18 U. ARu. LrrrLE RocK L.J. 613, 613 (1996) (describing video-
tape as a "high-impact litigation tool" and noting that "as a means for offering testi-
mony from one's own witness, videotapes normally are the medium of choice").
134 Cianos v. State, 659 A.2d 291, 295 (Md. 1995).
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federal courts have voluntarily received victim impact testimony, in
order to capture the flavor of the victims' experiences.1 3 5
It is important, incidentally, to recognize that victim impact testi-
mony need not be limited to emotionally-appealing victims or even to
the stories of defrauded individuals. Often, organizations are victims
of economic crimes, and they, too, may suffer harms beyond mere
economic loss. For example, more than 180 evangelical groups, col-
leges, and seminaries were victims of the pyramid scheme involving
the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy.136 Many religious organi-
zations, including the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith along
with numerous black Baptist churches, were among the defrauded vic-
tims of the Reverend Henry Lyons. 137 Unions can be victims.' 3 8
Banks can be victims. 13 9 Insurance companies can be victims too. 140
Organizations should not be excluded from the opportunity to pre-
sent victim impact testimony any more than individual victims should
be excluded.' 4 ' Organizations can express their victimhood in the
same way that any organizational value is expressed-through their
elected or appointed leaders. 42
What is most important, though, is that all victims of serious fed-
eral crimes be given a realistic opportunity to be present in the court-
room, to be heard with respect to issues that are relevant to the
135 See cases cited supra note 19.
136 See Tony Carnes, New Era's Bennett to Prison: How Could a Little-Known Christian
Business Executive Defraud Charities of $354 Million While Claiming To Do God's Work?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997, at 86.
137 See Black Baptists: A Collection for What?, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 13, 1999, at 30.
138 See Lou Mumford, Former Niles Police Officer AvoidsJail, S. BEND TRIB., Feb. 23,
1999, at DI (detailing an embezzlement from the local Fraternal Order of Police).
139 See T. Christopher McLaughlin et al., Financial Institutions Fraud, 1998 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 789, 802-07 (detailing recent prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1344
(1994) for bank fraud).
140 See Deborah Lohse & Mitchell Pacelle, Case of Vanishing Manager and Missing
Millions, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1999, at C1 (describing a fraud involving at least $218
million in losses and resulting in the insolvency of at least eight insurance
companies).
141 See United States v. Ruffen, 780 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986) (awarding
restitution to a governmental agency victimized by defendant's scheme to defraud);
United States v. Trettenaro, 601 F. Supp. 183, 185 (D. Colo. 1985) (awarding restitu-
tion to a corporate victim); United States v. Hendey, 585 F. Supp. 458, 462 (D. Colo.
1984) (same); see also Deborah P. Kelly, Have Victim Reforms Gone Too Far-Or Not Far
Enough?: What Their New Rights Mean, CRiM. JusT., Fall 1991, at 22, 25 (noting that
medical clinics and other institutions have successfully used victim participation
statutes).
142 See United States v. Medford, 194 F.3d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 1999) (recounting the
victim impact testimony of the president of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania,
from which priceless artifacts had been stolen by the defendant).
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sentencing decision, and to educate the judge as to the many 'and
varied consequences of economic crimes. The more detail they are
able to provide, the more easily the judge will be able to articulate a
basis for her sentencing decision. And the more detailed (and
thoughtful) the sentencing decision, the less likely it is to be reversed
on appeal.
It is this aspect of the victim allocution proposal that is most com-
pelling in my view-not that it will afford victims the opportunity to
purge their emotions (though in many cases that may be one result of
the allocution experience), but that it will afford victims the opportu-
nity to educate the judge on the true nature and consequences of the
crime.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST VicTm ALLOCUTION
There are nine obvious arguments against the required use of
victim impact testimony in the sentencing phase of an economic
crime case: (1) allocution hearings will consume judicial resources;
(2) preparation for the hearings will consume prosecutorial re-
sources; (3) allocution will tend to reward, and thus to protract, the
witness's feelings of victimhood; (4) it will encourage disorder and
histrionics in the courtroom; (5) it may result in disparate sanctioning
outcomes depending on the articulateness of the testifying victims;
(6) in cases of multiple victims, it may exclude victims who desire to
testify, thus compounding their frustration and feelings of loss; (7) it
may be fruitless in terms of its intended behavioral impact; (8) it may
(paradoxically) result in exacerbation of victim dissatisfaction; and (9)
it is merely a retributive device, designed to infringe the defendant's
right to a fair sentence. All these concerns are legitimate, and each
has been advanced with respect to victim allocution in violent crime
cases.
A. Cost and Court Time
Of course, any proposal that would extend the time required of a
judge to determine an appropriate sentence is open to challenge.
And requiring a court to entertain the testimony of an economic vic-
tim or a group of victims will inevitably take up some scarce court
time. One cannot merely dispatch such witnesses, but must treat
them with care and respect and solicitude. One must be patient.
Even with coaching, most victim witnesses will be hesitant, perhaps
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inarticulate, but will want to tell their stories in some detail. 145 In ad-
dition, those stories will likely be duplicative of some of the testimony
already received during the guilt phase of the trial or of material con-
tained in the defendant's pre-sentence investigation report.144
The simple response to concerns about time is to permit the
judge to set time limits on victim impact testimony, to set limits on the
number of victims permitted to testify,145 and even, perhaps, to re-
quire the victim witnesses to confine their remarks to a prepared
script or outline.1 46 So long as all parties know the court's expecta-
tions, time and cost can be kept to a minimum. 147
B. Prosecutorial Resources
A related concern about victim allocution is that selecting victims
to testify and orchestrating victim impact presentations will demand
increased time and attention from federal prosecutors and victim ser-
143 SeeJOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 130 (1990) ("[In small claims court cases,] the
opportunity to tell [one's] whole story is sometimes more important than the
result.").
144 See supra note 84.
145 In the sentencing hearing for Timothy McVeigh following his conviction for
the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995, the court limited the
number of witnesses who could present in-court victim impact testimony. " [T ] hese
[thirty-eight] witnesses comprised an extremely small percentage of the number of
potential witnesses the government might have called .... " United States v. McVeigh,
153 F.3d 1166, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998). At the sentencing hearing for Terry Nichols,
the prosecutors were permitted to call fifty-five victim witnesses. See No Execution for
Terry Nichols, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at A26.
146 See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996) (permitting a vic-
tim witness to read his or her written testimony only if it is previously approved by the
court).
147 Overall, studies have shown that involvement of victims in the trial and sen-
tencing process does not prolong the proceedings. See Deborah P. Kelly & Edna
Erez, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in VICrIMS OF CRIME 231, 237
(Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997). The experience of the state courts, several
of which have been subject to comprehensive victims' rights legislation for several
years now, is that the inclusion of victim impact testimony from victims of non-violent
crimes has in no way overwhelmed those systems or their judges. See Hearing, supra
note 114, at 18 (statement of Darrell Ashlock, President of Missouri Victim Assistance
Network, Inc.) (arguing that those states-such as Missouri-that extend victims'
rights protections to victims of non-violent as well as violent crimes have not found
the system unworkable); id. at 23 (statement of Joe Traylor, President of AID for
Victims of Crime, Inc.) (arguing that those states that have extended procedural
rights to victims of non-violent crimes have "not [been] bogged down as a result").
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vices persbnnel. These resources are always limited and jealously
guarded. 48
To some extent, Congress has already anticipated these sorts of
concerns, by permitting use of the Crime Victims Fund to address the
needs of economic crime victims.' 49 As a consequence, the Victims of
Crime Act Victim Assistance Program Guidelines have recently been
amended to take into account the needs of those victims,' 50 a hand-
book for fraud victims has been prepared,' 5 ' and a video has been
circulated to U.S. Attorneys' offices across the country, illustrating
both the problems of fraiud victims and the means of addressing them
in the course of fraud prosecutions. 52
Resource issues, nevertheless, are legitimate. We are talking
about increasing the number of cases in which victim impact testi-
mony would be required by more than 14,000 defendants each
year.' 53 If these cases were spread evenly across the U.S. Attorneys'
offices (an unlikely proposition), that could mean up to 150 addi-
tional victim impact presentations per office each year.'54
One response to this concern is that not all eligible victims will
exercise their right of allocution so the burden on U.S. Attorneys' of-
fices should not be as great as these numbers at first suggest. Accord-
ing to one victims' services professional, many victims-especially
victims of financial crimes-"live far away, don't want to waste any
more time or money, are intimidated at the thought" of appearing
before a federal judge and are "happier to write than to speak" about
148 Recently, for example, federal prosecutors lobbied successfully to exclude vic-
tims of non-violent crimes from coverage under a proposed victims' rights constitu-
tional amendment, largely because of concerns about resource issues. See Eaton,
supra note 5.
149 See id.
150 See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIE, 1997 VOCA VIcTIM
ASSISTANCE FINAL PROGRAM GUIDELINES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/welcovc/
scad/guides/vaguide.htm (last modified Apr. 19, 2001).
151 See OFFICE FOR VICIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, ROLES, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILIIES: A HANDBOOK FOR FRAUD VICTIMS PARTICIPATING IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publicadons/infores/
fraud/rrr/rrrpdf.pdf (last modified Apr. 19, 2001).
152 See Videotape: Victims of Fraud: Beyond the Financial Loss (Office for Victims
of Crime, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1998).
153 See BUREAU OF JUSTIcE STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 53
tbl.4.1 (indicating that approximately 15,000 persons were tried for felony-level "prop-
erty offenses" (including all forms of fraud) in federal courts in 1998). The figure
above assumes that 95% of these defendants would be found or plead guilty. See id.
154 There are 93 U.S. Attorney's offices. See Executive Office for United States
Attorneys, at http://wvw.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/index.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2001).
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their victimhood experiences. 155 Recent studies also make clear that
victims who are entitled to offer victim allocution (in those states
where allocution is available for all felonies, for example) often de-
cline to do so.156
Another (and more persuasive) response is that funds for the
support of victim allocution should be plentiful in coming years. The
Crime Victims Fund is fed largely by criminal fines,1 57 and, in recent
years, the Antitrust Division alone has delivered more than two billion
dollars in such fines to the Treasury. 158 The Crime Victims Fund may
be used (1) to respond to the emotional and physical needs of crime
victims; (2) to assist victims of crime in stabilizing their lives after a
victimization; (3) to help victims understand and participate in the
criminal justice system; and (4) to provide victims of crime with a mea-
sure of safety and security.' 59 The breadth of the fund (and the depth
of its pockets) means that resources should be available to help sup-
port victim services for economic crime victims.
A third response to concerns about resources is that the rules gov-
erning victim allocution can be drafted so as to minimize the impact
on prosecutors and their offices. In the proposal in this Article, for
example, I address those concerns by (1) excluding all misdemeanor
cases from the victim allocution provision; 1 60 (2) expressly permitting
155 Telephone Interview with Karen Spinks, Victim-Witness Coordinator, Office of
the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia (Sept. 1, 1999).
156 In an early study of victim allocution in California, "very few victims took ad-
vantage of [the allocution] opportunity.... [O]nly about 3 percent of the eligible
victims... made statements at sentencing hearings." ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VIC-
TIMs: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY 202 (2d ed. 1990) (citing EDWIN VILLMOARE
& VIRGINIA V. NETO, VICriM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING UNDER CALIFORNIA'S VIC-
TIMS' BILL OF RIGHTS (Nat'l Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Research in Brief No.
NCJ 107206, 1987)). A more recent study reports that, of those permitted to do so,
over 90% of victims surveyed made an in-court statement at the sentencing proceed-
ing. See DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS-DoES LEGAL PRO-
TECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 6 (Nat'l Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Research
in Brief No. NCJ 173839, 1998), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173839.pdf.
Recent experience in Missouri has been in between these figures, averaging just
under a 20% victim allocution rate. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 18 (statement of
Darrell Ashlock, President of Missouri Victim Assistance Network, Inc.).
157 See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b) (1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
158 See Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of'Justice, Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Fine of
$10 Million or More (May 23, 2001), at http://wvw.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/
8271.pdf.
159 See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEI'T OFJusTICE, supra note 25, app. A
(emphasis added).
160 Such cases currently represent 17% of the federal courts' workload. See Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 39 tbl.3.1.
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the sentencing judge to limit the number of victims who can testify;161
and (3) suggesting that many federal financial felonies are in fact "vic-
t imless" for purposes of victim allocution. 162 In short, only some fel-
ony cases will result in victim allocution, and those that do should be
amply supported by the resources of the Crime Victims Fund.
C. Exacerbation of Victimhood
Some critics have suggested that permitting a victim to appear in
court to testify regarding her experiences serves only to reinforce the
victim's preoccupation with her loss. Apparently, there has been no
real research on this issue, but let's assume that, at least for some vic-
tims, victim allocution may do more harm than good.
As Paul Gewirtz writes,
We have been assuming thus far that survivors are pushing to have
their stories heard and that allowing victim impact evidence to be
considered at the sentencing phase promotes the interests of the
victims and the survivors. But surely the dynamic of survivor testi-
mony is far more complicated. To tell the story of personal suffer-
ing requires the teller to relive that suffering, to retrieve it from
repression, to reexpose wounds that may have started to heal. This
may be beneficially therapeutic, but it may not be. 163
The presence of victim services professionals in U.S. Attorneys'
offices should minimize this problem, and recent publications ad-
dressing the special needs of fraud victims' 6 4 should make the efforts
of these professionals even more successful. Further, U.S. Attorneys
should be encouraged to select which persons among a group of vic-
tims are likely to be the most effective witnesses and most able to cope
with the emotions unleashed in the course of providing victim impact
testimony, should limit the risk that unhealthy victimhood will be
rewarded.
161 See infra Part VI.
162 See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
163 Gewirtz, supra note 132, at 148.
[I] t is well known that certain forms of intervention can.." aggravate or
perpetuate the psychological wounds rather than healing them. Some inter-
ventions can be effective in some cases and totally ineffective in others or
beneficial to some recipients and deleterious to others.... [V]ictim services
might have a side effect of delaying the natural healing process and prolong-
ing the trauma of victimization.
Ezzat A. Fattah, Toward a Victim Policy Aimed at Healing, Not Suffering, in VICTIMS OF
CRIME, supra note 147, at 257, 268.
164 See generally, e.g., OFFICE FOR VIcriMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 25 (outlining services provided for fraud victims).
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D. The Likelihood of Emotional Outbursts
A recurring concern about victim impact testimony is that the vic-
tim will lose his composure in the courtroom. Some critics fear the
spread of "lawless emotionalism" in court proceedings. 165 Others de-
cry the "Oprah-ization of sentencing."' 66 Judge Richard Matsch, who
presided over both the Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols trials, ex-
pressed a concern that the overwhelming emotional force of extensive
victim impact testimony in those trials might turn the proceedings
"into some kind of lynching."' 67 Whatever the metaphor, the concern
is familiar: victims set free to describe their losses will overwhelm the
decisionmaker's ability to exercise reasoned judgment.
A victim's loss of control while testifying about her victimization
may be especially troubling where the sentencing decision is made by
a jury,168 but there is no jury sentencing in federal economic crime
cases. Rather, the decisionmaker in a federal economic crime case is
an experienced, professional, federal judge. These judges-like all
judges-are accustomed to dealing with emotional witnesses. 69 So,
the mere fact that some economic crime victims-like some violent
crime victims-may become emotional or distraught in their victim
impact presentations is no reason, standing alone, to reject the use of
victim allocution.
It is also possible to limit the likelihood of an emotional outburst
by setting time limits, excluding certain subjects, 70 indicating to the
165 See Editorial, Victim Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1995, at 9.
166 See Michael J. Sandel, The Hard Questions: CiyingforJustice, NEW REPUBLIC, July
7, 1997, at 25 (quoting a defense attorney).
167 See Tom Kenworthy & Lois Romano, Death-Penalty Testimony Limited;Judge Seeks
To Prevent "Lynching", CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 4, 1997, at 33.
168 In such cases, "when a victim impact witness succumbs to [her] emotions, the
trial court has a duty to take appropriate action." Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 893
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998). Otherwise, the jury's sentencing recommendation may be
voided. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony.., so infects the sentencing proceeding
as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under
the Due Process clause."); Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 920 (Okla. Crim. App.
1997) (finding that the probative value of victim impact evidence was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect where that evidence was "inflammatory" and "de-
signed to invoke an emotional response by the jury").
169 See Christopher Johns, Editorial, Court Not Place To Salve Victims, Amuz. REPUB-
LIC, June 29, 1997, at H5 ("It is true that daily courtrooms are unavoidably scenes of
intense emotions. Grief, anger, hate, greed and the grotesque are frequent inhabi-
tants of trial courts.").
170 For example, in the sentencing hearing of Timothy McVeigh, the sentencing
judge directed that victim witnesses not mention the funerals of loved ones who had
died as a result of the federal building bombing and not present pictures of the vic-
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witness and her supporters that an emotional outburst will end that
witness's testimony, 171 or confining the witness's testimony to the
reading of a pre-approved statement.172 None of these practices need
be required in every case, but they are tools that should be available
(and are now available) to federal judges in every sentencing
proceeding.
There may be a larger issue, however, surrounding the issue of
victim emotionalism-that is, whether the federal courts should be
encouraged to limit victim impact testimony to that which is profes-
sionally attractive or socially acceptable. Judges often prefer to take
victim impact testimony in its most bloodless form--in writing. 7 3
They recognize that, by its nature, live victim impact testimony often
"cannot be controlled." 74
The simple response to these (often class-based) concerns is that
federal judges' comfort level (and the status quo which currently af-
fords them total discretion as to whether to entertain live victim im-
pact testimony in economic crime cases) ought not to govern this
issue. Rather, public policy concerns-specifically, principles of eq-
uity and restorative justice' 7 -- should override the judges' (perfectly
understandable) preferences for victims whose behavior they find to
tims or their family members at weddings, Christmas celebrations, or other joyous
occasions. See Beth E. Sullivan, Note, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of
Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and
Prudice, 25 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 601, 621 n.82 (1998) (citations omitted). Judge
Matsch also prohibited the use of certain videotapes of victims and the testimony of a
nine-year old concerning the loss of his mother. See Kevin Flynn, Boy's Words Describe
Life Without Mom, RocKY MOUNTAN NEvs, June 7, 1997, at 10A; Penalty Testimony Pow-
erfu4 DENVER POST, June 12, 1997, at A22; see also Collins, supra note 18, at 28.
171 See, e.g., Huffman v. State, 543 N.E.2d 360, 376 (Ind. 1989) (recounting trial
judge's admonition-after the victim's mother cried and fled the courtroom-that if
another outburst occurred, the victim's family would be removed from the court-
room); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996) ("During the preliminary
hearing, the trial court should inform the victim's family that the court will not allow
a witness to testify if the person is unable to control his or her emotions.").
172 See, e.g., Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 180 (permitting a victim witness to read his or
her written testimony only if it is previously approved by the court).
173 See Sandra Crockett, A Voice for the Victims, BALT. SUN, June 26, 1995, at ID.
"There's nothing those [victim impact witnesses] could tell me that [hasn't]
already been said in whatever letters I've rdceived .... While I respect their
right to be heard, we're already running, I think, a half hour late. I really
don't think it would be beneficial to take the time to hear from them."
Id. (quoting a trial judge).
174 See Ball v. State, 699 A.2d 1170, 1189 (Md. 1997).
175 See infra Part V.C.
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be "appropriate" and whose presentation to the court is untainted by
emotion.
E. The Problem of the Inarticulate Victim
One problem with victim allocution is that not all victims are simi-
larly gifted in describing their experiences, expressing their pain, or
communicating effectively with the sentencing judge. In a series of
well-drawn hypotheticals, Donald Hall has illustrated how the educa-
tional level of a victim, his race, his ability to formulate a coherent
story, his mental stability, his ability to hire a lawyer to assist him, and
his own criminal history all may influence the way in which a judge
receives that person's victim impact testimony.176 Hall also points out
that, in a survey of judges, "a number of judges observed that articu-
late victims' statements, whether written or oral, were far more effec-
tive than those received from inarticulate victims.1 77
Victim advocates may be able to assist victims in preparing for
their in-court appearance, but even with rehearsal, many victims-es-
pecially those who are elderly, ill-educated, or speakers of English as a
second language-may be intimidated by the courtroom setting, em-
barrassed to speak before a distinguished federal judge and, thus, una-
ble to tell their stories effectively. This could lead to increased
frustration, a continuing sense of their own incompetence, or a sense
that their efforts were not recognized or appreciated.
Even so, the risk that some victims will not be as forceful as
others, or as reasoned in their presentations, should not exclude all
economic crime victims from testifying at sentencing hearings. Once
again, the ability of the U.S. Attorneys' offices to select out those vic-
tims with the greatest ability to tell their stories well and those with the
most compelling personal characteristics should minimize the
problems of the inarticulate victim. And where selection does not
eliminate the problem (in the case of a fraud with a handful of vic-
tims, for example), support from victim services personnel should go
a long way toward minimizing the problem.
F. Problems of Exclusion and the Representative Victim
The inevitable by-product of those steps that can be taken to min-
imize both emotionalism and inarticulateness is that, in cases of multi-
176 See DonaldJ. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 Am.
CRiM. L. REV. 233, 236-38, 259 (1991).
177 Id. at 246 (citing HILLENBRAND & SMITH, VICTIM RIGHTS LEGISLATION: AN As-
SESSMENT OF ITS IMPACT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS AND VICTIMS 70 (A.B.A.
Crim. Just. Sec., Victim Witness Project 1989)).
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pie fraud victims, not everyone who wishes to do so may be permitted
to testify. This means that the judge will have to decide how much
time she wishes to llot to hearing presentations of victim impact testi-
mony, and the prosecutor will then have to make choices about whom
to present. In some cases, the process of winnowing may cause disap-
pointed fraud victims to feel that they have been victimized once
again.
Nevertheless, limiting victim witnesses to a reasonable number
may be required by due process considerations. 178 It may also re-
present the most effective form of advocacy. Either way, a prosecutor
orchestrating the sentencing proceeding has a duty to select victims
who are both representative of the universe of the defendant's victims
and able to withstand the rigors of victim impact testimony. The fact
that some victims who desire to testify will not be selected for this task,
and may be angry with the prosecutor or the court or "the system," is
not sufficient reason to exclude victim impact testimony by other wit-
nesses. Rather, these problems should be the focus of attention for
victim advocates and victim services professionals.
G. The Unlikelihood of Influencing the Defendant's State of Mind
If one purpose of victim allocution is to make some kind of moral
impression on the defendant, 79 the proposal in this Article will often
fail. Some-perhaps many-defendants will be morally indifferent to
having to listen to the stories their victims tell the court. Some de-
fendants-especially in fraud cases-show no remorse for their ac-
tions, regard their victims as suckers and fools, and regard the court
system as just another "mark" to be conned. Many fraud defendants
are repeat offenders; 80 some fraud defendants even continue their
178 See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 176 (N.J. 1996) (indicating that the use
of victim impact testimony "requires a balancing of the probative value of the prof-
fered evidence against the risk that its admission may pose the danger of undue
prejudice or confusion"); Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's
Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 223 (1995) ("Information overload
may... lead to unfair sentencing. As the amount of information and the number of
people testifying at a sentencing hearing increases, so does the risk of unjust
punishment.").
179 See infra Part V.B.
180 Studies of the records of persons convicted of mail fraud, bank embezzlement,
income tax evasion, false claims, and bribery have found that approximately 40% of
the offenders had at least one prior arrest. See Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth Moore,
Are White-Collar and Common Offenders the Same? An Empirical and Theoretical Critique of a
Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime, 29J. RES. CreME & DELINQ. 251, 260 (1992);
David Weisburd et al., White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Some Preliminary Findings,
36 CRIME & DELrNQ. 342, 343-47 (1990) (discussing how white-collar criminals are
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scams while in prison.1 8 1
Thus, for some defendants at whom victim impact testimony
would be directed, the notions of shaming or moral education are
irrelevant, perhaps even laughable. And the idea that any defendant
would be likely to develop empathy for his victims as a consequence of
having to listen to them tell their stories in the context of a request for
enhanced sentencing may be fanciful. So be it.
As in the case of uncontrollable witnesses, the argument must be
that just because some-indeed many-defendants may well be im-
mune to victim impact testimony at the time it is offered, that is no
reason to exclude all victim impact testimony in economic crime
cases. Victim impact testimony has multiple purposes: to express com-
munity values, to assist the judge in reaching an appropriate sentenc-
ing determination, to unburden the witness, and to enlighten the
defendant. That not all of these purposes will be satisfied in many of
the cases in which victim allocution would be required, or be satisfied
at the same time, is no reason to reject the victim allocution proposal.
H. Inadequate Return on the Victim's Emotional Investment
Another concern is that in-court victim impact testimony-espe-
cially if it is offered by just a few among many victims of an economic
crime-will be no more effective in purging the victims' emotions re-
garding the crime than the less costly, less time-consuming written
victim impact statement has proven to be. Even those victims who are
permitted to testify may be disappointed. There is no real evidence
that offering victim impact testimony results in a more satisfying en-
counter with the judicial system than filling out a written victim im-
pact statement.182 In fact, there is some evidence that victim impact
testimony may be less satisfying than filling out a victim impact
often repeat offenders). For just one example of a recidivist defrauder, see Michael
Perlstein, Couple Given Stiff Sentencesfor Scam, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 18,
1999, at BI (reporting on a defendant who "launched [an elaborate fraud scheme
that resulted in $3.3 million in losses to his victims] while on parole from an earlier
federal fraud conviction").
181 See Scott Higham, Swindler Draws Top Sentence, 12 1/2 Years, BALT. SUN, Feb. 8,
1997, at 2B (reporting on a defendant in a home-refinancing scheme who, after being
sent to federal prison, was accused of swindling a fellow inmate out of $15,000).
182 Indeed, there is some evidence that systems that offer an opportunity to submit
a written victim impact statement offers no more victim satisfaction than systems in
which such statements are prohibited. See Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, Victim
Impact Statements and Victim Satisfaction: An Unfulfilled Promise?, 22 J. GRM. JUST. 1,
10-11 (1994) (finding that victims permitted to submit a written victim impact state-
ment did not report greater satisfaction with the criminal justice system than those
not permitted to do so); Edna Erez et al., Victim Harm, Impact Statements and Victim
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form, 8 3 most likely because a witness permitted to testify has a higher
level of expectation than those who are confined to written
expression.
Not only may allocution prove disappointing, moreover, but in-
court testimony, and all the stress that it entails, may add to, rather
than reduce, victims' feelings of dissatisfaction with the system. As
one commentator has noted, "[tihe victim is unlikely to feel that a
courtroom is the light place for this kind of emotional experience." 184
Another has argued that "most judges and lawyers simply aren't
trained to respond in any therapeutic sense to grief."'185
That being said, studies do suggest that, in general, the more par-
ticipation ajurisdiction affords crime victims, the greater the victims'
levels of satisfaction and sense of resolution of the matter. 8 6 There
are many reasons why this is so:
For some, [providing victim impact evidence to the court restored]
the unequal balance between themselves and the offender, particu-
larly in cases in which the victim did not have an opportunity to
testify or be heard because they were resolved by a plea. Others
wanted "to communicate the impact of the offense to the
offender."187
Still others "wanted to remind judges of the fact that behind the
crime is a real person who is a victim."'188 Providing victim impact
testimony can further any of these objectives.
The "feel good" factor may not be enough, however. Looking at
these studies more critically, we find that victims who believed their
participation had an impact on their cases were more satisfied with
their experience as a victim witness than those who thought their par-
Satisfaction with Justice: An Australian Experience 5 INT'L. REV. VICTuMOLOGY 37, 51
(1997) (same).
183 For example, one study suggests that 62% of the victims given the opportunity
to present an oral victim impact statement were satisfied with their experience with
the criminal justice system, while 66% of the victims given the opportunity to present
a written victim impact statement reported satisfaction. See IMPACT STATEMENTS: A
VICTIM'S PaGHT To SPEAF, A NATION's RESPONSIBILIY To LISTEN (Ellen K. Alexander
& Janice Harris Lord eds., 1994), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/help/impact
184 Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 980
(1985).
185 Johns, supra note 169, at H5;. see also Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A
Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 59 (1992)
("The system is not equipped to nurture victims or their representatives.").
186 See Kelly & Erez, supra note 147, at 239.
187 Erez, supra note 102, at 551.
188 Id. at 552.
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ticipation was meaningless.' 8 9 Thus, one might readily hypothesize
that victims providing testimony in jurisdictions (like the federal sys-
tem) that are governed by strict sentencing guidelines may be more
dissatisfied than victims providing testimony in jurisdictions giving
judges more discretion in sentencing decisions. 190 They may also feel
that the use of complex guidelines-which necessarily require the
sentencing judge to prepare preliminary calculations in advance of
the sentencing hearing-will render their testimony extraneous or
unwelcome. This in turn might suggest that victim allocution in the
federal sentencing context is a recipe for frustration and dissatisfac-
tion. A study conducted abroad suggests that this is not the case and
that victims who provide victim impact evidence have a high level of
satisfaction even where they conclude that it has had little appreciable
impact on the sentence.' 91
One way of dealing with the concern about victim dissatisfaction
would be to conduct a pilot study in one or more judicial circuits, just
as studies have previously been conducted regarding cameras in the
courtroom, electronic document filing, and alternative dispute resolu-
tion. The experiences of victims who have been granted the right to
allocution could then be compared to those who have not.
Another (and, in my view, preferable) way of dealing with this
concern is to have federal victim services personnel explain in careful
detail the way in which the Sentencing Guidelines work, the limita-
tions they impose on sentencing judges, and the issues to which victim
impact testimony can most effectively be directed, including claims
related to psychological and other non-monetary harms, I92 claims re-
lated to abuses of trust,193 claims relating to the victim's "unusual vul-
nerability,' 94 and (perhaps most important) claims that can clearly
demonstrate to the sentencing judge the lasting and devastating im-
pact that can result from economic crime victimization. Victims
should be told that judges are educable when it comes to crime vic-
tims' concerns 195 and that their testimony is important but will not be
189 See KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 156, at 8.
190 See Hall, supra note 176, at 265 (noting that in states governed by sentencing
guidelines, a victim's testimony, however forceful, is likely to have only a small, if not
negligible, impact on the sentence).
191 See Erez, supra note 102, at 552 ("[F]or the majority of the victims filing [a
written victim impact] statement was a worthwhile therapeutic experience, and the
cathartic effect of recording the impact of the offence had been an end in itself.").
192 See supra Part I.A.1.
193 See supra Part I.A.4.
194 See supra Part I.A.3.
195 See Erez, supra note 102, at 554.
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dispositive of the sentencing decision. They should also be advised
that testimony is not therapy.
With preparation and professional counseling, the limitations of
allocution-and the limitations of the Sentencing Guidelines-need
not be fatal to the proposal advanced in this Article.
I. Victim Allocution Is Merely a Vehicle for Harsher Sentencing
A final objection to victim allocution in economic crime cases is
that, like other victims' rights mechanisms, allocution is really just de-
signed to persuade the sentencing judge to impose a draconian sen-
tence.1 96 It would be perfectly fine, according to this view, to
permit-even encourage-victims to pursue their claims against the
defendant in a civil proceeding. Let them sue; let them testify; let
them vent within the context of a civil trial for damages. They should
not, however, be permitted to influence the criminal sentencing
process.
There are at least three responses to this (again, legitimate) con-
cern. First, not all victim impact testimony is aimed at enhancing the
defendant's sentence. The Guidelines permit evidence of mitigating
as well as aggravating circumstances, 197 and, although it is uncom-
mon, victims have sometimes offered such evidence, even in capital
cases. 198 Further, studies show that, even where testimony has been
aimed at sentence enhancement, some judges have reduced the
sentences they originally had in mind as a result of hearing victim
impact testimony.199 Certainly, the presence of victim impact testi-
196 See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 401 (1996) (arguing that victim allocution is "prejudicial and
inflammatory").
197 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (permitting departure
where victim's conduct was provocative); id. § 5K2.12 (permitting departure where
defendant acted under duress); id. § 5K2.13 (permitting departure where the defen-
dant committed the crime while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capac-
ity); id. § 5K2.20 (permitting departure where defendant's conductwas aberrational);
id. § 5K2.0 (permitting departure for other mitigating circumstances).
198 In the case involving the 1993 murder of Matthew Shepard, for example, the
victim's parents argued that the death penalty ought not to be imposed on the killer,
even though they personally supported the death penalty in other cases. SeeJulie
Cart, Killer of Gay Student Is Spared Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at Al; see
also Karen L. Kennard, The Victim's Veto: A Way To Increase Victim Impact on Criminal
Case Dispositions, 77 GAL. L. REV. 417, 447 (1989) ("[M]any victims.., exercise their
influence in the direction of leniency.").
199 See Erez, supra note 102, at 548.
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mony does not always mean that requests for enhancement or depar-
tures will be granted.200
Second, and more importantly, the Sentencing Guidelines
sharply circumscribe judges in the degree to which they can punish
defendants, even in the most heinous cases. However powerful the
victim impact testimony may be, judges cannot simply impose
whatever sentence they want, and their efforts to do so will be reversed
on appeal.201 Thus, to the extent that victim impact testimony has the
potential to inflame the decisionmaker or distort her judgment (and
remember that in this proposal, the sentencing decisionmaker is the
judge and not a jury), the Sentencing Guidelines and the appellate
process both serve as a strong source of discipline and protection.
Third, it is not at all illegitimate to provide a forum for victims to
seek retributional punishment for their offenders, so long as the sys-
tem is designed to moderate that impulse. It may be true that victim
allocution is usually "an enormous benefit to the prosecution because
the defendant will almost certainly lose this sort of contest. '20 2 But
victim allocution, as confined by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is
only a mechanism for victims' expression, not a guarantee of excessive
state punishment of the defendant.
V. VICrIM ALLoCUTION IN THEORY
Three bodies of theory and research support the proposal for vic-
tim allocution in economic crime cases. First, the "denunciation" the-
ory of punishment suggests that, to be socially legitimate, any
punishment system must clearly express the community's moral con-
demnation of the defendant's behavior.203 It must say to her, "You
200 One recent study suggests that there is, at best, a "meager" correlation between
the use of victim allocution and the imposition of harsher sentences. See Paul G.
Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights Amendment,
1999 UTAH L. REv. 479, 542 (demonstrating only a slight increase in death penalty
decisions after the Supreme Court's approval of victim allocution in Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)); see also Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim
Participation in Sentencing on Sentence Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 468-69 (1990)
(stating that, though the presence of the victim in court may have a measurable effect
on sentence length, "[n] either the inclusion of a VIS in the file nor the victim's mak-
ing an oral statement in court influence [s] the length of the prison term").
201 See, e.g., United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing
the trial judge's two-level upward departure for lack of a sufficient foundation to sup-
port the departure).
202 Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitution: Moving from Guarantee-
ing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1053, 1060 (1998).
203 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
598 (1996) (discussing the importance of a sentencing system that expresses the com-
[VOL. 77:1
ALLOCUTION FOR VICTIMS OF ECONOMIC CRIMES
have done something terribly wrong, in our view." Victim allocution
can facilitate this result. Second, the "moral education," or "moral
reform" theory of punishment suggests that a well-designed punish-
ment system should influence the defendant's attitudes and behavior,
and discourage him from committing future criminal acts. 20 4 It must
say to him, 'You have done something wrong, and here's how you can
go about becoming a morally better person." In many cases, victim
allocution can facilitate this result as well. Third, theories of restora-
tive justice suggest that a properly constructed punishment system
must address not only the needs of the community for effective de-
nunciation and the needs of the defendant for some degree of moral
re-education, but also must meet some significant needs of the vic-
tim.2 05 It must say to her, '"e know you have suffered at the hands of
this defendant, and society recognizes your loss." Victim allocution
can also facilitate this outcome.
A. Allocution Is a Veiicle for Societal Denunciation
The first basis for embracing victim allocution is to look at sen-
tencing from the perspective of the law-abiding public. The denunci-
ation theory of punishment is addressed to that public and has as its
focus the public's "interest in ajust scheme of punishment."20 6 Specif-
ically, the denunciation theory says that "those who disobey criminal
laws should be held up to the rest of society and denounced as viola-
tors of the rules that define what the society represents."20 7 The mes-
sage of denunciation should be clear and unambignous-"You have
behaved unacceptably and society therefore condemns you."
Some critics argue that mere denunciation-the cataloguing of
"moral facts about what is right and wrong"-is not as important an
objective of the criminal justice system as is moral reformation-
munity's moral condemnation of the defendant's behavior); see also Ronald J.
Rychlak, Society's Moral Right To Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory
of Punishment, 65 TuL. L. REV. 299, 332 (1990) (describing punishment as an essential
means of reinforcing societal values).
204 See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate2, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
733, 739 (1998) (discussing the need for a sentencing system that can "morally 'edu-
cate' (the defendant], to make him see the error of his ways, and ideally, to lead to
him to repentance"). See generally Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory ofPun-
ishment, 13 PHrI. & PuB. Arr. 208 (1984) (setting out moral education theory as a basis
for inflicting punishment).
205 See MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICnMS AND OFFENDERS: A REsToRATrVE RE-
SPONSE TO CRIME 110-14, 117 (1991).
206 Rychlak, supra note 203, at 335.
207 Id. at 331.
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"teach [ing] criminals how to make better moral decisions .... ,,208
But denunciation has an independent societal value, even where
moral reformation would seem to be impossible. As Dan Kahan
points out, "[p]unishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it
is a special social convention that signifies moral condemnation." 20 9
It is for this reason that sentences are handed down in public, that
judges often accompany the announcement of their sentences with
critical comments directed at the defendant, and that defendants are
required to be present when sentence is rendered.210
Denunciation typically comes from the prosecutor in her argu-
ments to the jury and to the sentencing judge, and from the sentenc-
ing judge while handing down the sentence. But denunciation may
equally, and often as effectively, come from the victim(s) of a crime.
This is so, in part, because of the passion that a victim is likely to bring
to the denunciation process. But this is also true because the public
can often more easily identify with the victim's expressions of denun-
ciation than with the studied and professional statements of the prose-
cutor or the judge.
B. Allocution Is a Vehicle for Moral Education
Another way of looking at victim allocution is from the defen-
dant's perspective. Ideally, a sentencing proceeding will be designed
to have some impact on the defendant, cause him to examine his
criminal behavior, and cause him in the future to conform to societal
norms. One way to accomplish these objectives is through some form
of "shaming ritual"211 by which the defendant is held up to the moral
judgment of persons whose opinions he values and is caused to feel
unworthy of their esteem-or even their love-unless he changes.212
An even better way to accomplish these objectives may be through
some educative process by which the defendant is made to "recognize
208 See Lisa Anne Smith, Supplemental Paper: The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment,
37 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 200 (1995).
209 Kahan, supra note 203, at 593 (emphasis in original).
210 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994) (requiring the court to provide a statement of
reasons for imposing a sentence); FED. R. ClM. P. 43(a) (requiring the defendant's
presence at sentencing).
211 The term "shaming ritual" is taken from anthropological studies. See Toni M.
Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1906-15
(1991) (describing shaming rituals from other cultures); see also WILLIAM IAN MILLER,
HUMILIATION: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE
161-65 (1993) (describing the universal characteristics of shaming rituals).
212 SeeJOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 57-59, 69-83 (1989)
(describing the shaming process and its objectives).
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and understand why what he has done was wrong, and ideally, to
repent."213
One example of an effort to achieve some combination of sham-
ing and moral education is the Victim Impact Panel (VIP) program
initiated in 1982 by Mothers Against Drunk Drivers.
Victim impact panels provide a forum for crime victims to tell a
group of offenders about the impact of the crime on their lives and
on the lives of their families, friends, and neighbors. Panels typi-
cally involve three or four victim speakers, each of whom spends
about 15 minutes telling their story in a non-judgmental, non-blam-
ing manner. The offenders of the victim presenters are not present.
While some time is usually dedicated to questions and answers, the
purpose of the panel is for the victims to speak, rather than for the
victims and offenders to engage in a dialogue. 214
The purpose of victim impact panels is "to individualize and hu-
manize consequences to the victims, to change attitudes and behav-
iors, to deter drinking [and] driving, and to reduce recidivism."215
Most offenders who complete evaluations after listening to a victim
impact panel indicate that their experiences were "positive" and "edu-
cational" and "contributed to a change in their attitudes and percep-
tions about their crimes."216 There is also some evidence that victim
impact panels have had the intended effect of reducing recidivism
among drinking drivers.217
Victim impact panels take place outside of the courtroom and
typically are part of the punishment package, but the principles un-
derlying them can translate effectively into victim allocution at sen-
tencing: (1) VIP programs make it impossible for defendants to
escape into the anonymity of the criminal justice system; (2) VIPs re-
quire defendants to reflect on the pain of their victims in the presence
213 Garvey, supra note 204, at 763. According to Garvey, "It]he aim of the educat-
ing model is to get the offender himself to understand why what he did was wrong, an
understanding to which the morally appropriate emotional response is guilt. The aim
is not, as in the shaming model, to shame him in the eyes of others." Id. at 766.
214 Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Victim Impact Panels, at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/restjust/CH5/7_impnls.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). A
similar program has been developed for men convicted of rape. See Garvey, supra
note 204, at 781.
215 Dorothy Mercer et al., Drunken Driving Victim Impact Panels: Victim Out-
comes 4 (Aug. 11, 1995) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
216 Nat'l Inst. ofJustice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 214.
217 See Stuart W. Fors & Dean G. Rojek, The Effect of Victim Impact Panels on DUIl
DWlRearrest Rates: A Twelve-Month Follow-up, 60J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 514, 519 (1999)
(finding that the re-arrest rates for participants in VIP programs were lower than for
others convicted of drunk driving).
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of others; and (3) VIPs have at their core the fundamental belief that,
if exposed to the harm their conduct has caused, some criminal of-
fenders may change their behavior and ultimately become better so-
cial actors.
Permitting victim allocution in the sentencing process would rep-
licate these features, but in some respects more effectively than the
VIP system. First, the defendant in an economic crime case would be
required to confront directly, rather than indirectly, the losses occa-
sioned by his own behavior-that is, he would be forced to listen to
the words and claims of his own victims rather than those of
surrogates.
Second, victim allocution, unlike a VIP program, will not be a
part of the defendant's punishment but a precursor to it. It will not
provide an escape from confinement or a source of entertainment.
Rather, as a process, allocution is designed to command the defen-
dant's attention at precisely the time-the sentencing hearing-when
his energies are most focused on what is being said.
Third, victim allocution will involve some measure of public expo-
sure not found in typical VIP programs.2 18 The victim's comments
will be given under oath, in a courtroom, and in the presence of spec-
tators as well as the sentencing judge. By honoring the victim's pres-
entation with the gravitas of an official, rather than an ad hoc,
proceeding, victim allocution at sentencing should have a deeper and
more lasting impact on the defendant than may occur in the case of a
typical VIP.219
C. Allocution Is a Vehicle for Restorative Justice
A final way of looking at victim allocution is from the victim's
perspective. Under theories of restorative justice, sentencing should
be designed so as to restore the material and psychological losses ex-
perienced by the defendant's victim(s). 2 20 These theories have been
218 It is important to note, however, that the public aspect of the sentencing pro-
ceeding proposed here bears little resemblance to those shaming practices involving
posting signs, wearing of insignia, or taking out newspaper ads. Critics rightly chal-
lenge those practices as degrading, retributive, and "a species of lynch justice." See
James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055,
1058-59 (1998).
219 Sarah Welling points out that the sense that something important is happening
when the victim speaks in open court is a significant advantage of victim allocution.
See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 347
(1987).
220 See Howard Zehr, Restorative Justice: The Concept, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec.
1997, at 68, 68 ("Restorative justice begins with a concern for victims and how to meet
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implemented in a number of forms: restitutional programs, victim-of-
fender mediation programs (VOMs) (also sometimes known as victim-
offender reconciliation programs (VORPs)), and various victim sup-
port and advocacy programs. All of these programs, like the proposal
for victim allocution, have as their focus the recognition that it is the
victim-not the state-who suffers most harm from a crime.
VOM and VORP programs-which are typically used in cases of
non-violent crimes such as burglary, shoplifting, and vandalism-are
based on face-to-face encounters between the defendant and his
victim:
The meeting begins with the mediator explaining his or her role,
identifying the agenda and stating any ground rules that may be
necessary, such as allowing each party to complete their statements
before interrupting them with questions or comments.
The first part of the meeting focuses on a discussion of the facts and
feelings related to the crime. Victims are given the opportunity to
express their feelings directly to the person who violated them, as
well as to receive answers to lingering questions such as "Why me?"
or "Were you stalking us and planning on coming back?"
While offenders are put in the uncomfortable position of having to
face the people they violated, they also are given the rare chance to
show a more human dimension to their characters and to express
remorse in a very personal way.221
VOMs and VORPs have been shown to produce significant satis-
faction among both victim and defendant participants.222 Specifically,
"almost all [VOMs] produce mutually agreeable restitution plans that
are successfully completed, victims report a reduction of fear and anx-
iety, juvenile offenders commit considerably fewer and less serious
new crimes, and victims and offenders report high levels of satisfac-
their needs, for repairing the harm as much as possible, both concretely and
symbolically.").
221 Mark S. Umbreit, Having Offenders Meet with Their Victims Offers Benefits for Both
Parties, CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1991, at 164, 166. See generally Barbara E. Smith &
Susan W. Hillenbrand, Making Victims Whole Again: Restitution, Victim-Offender Reconcili-
ation Programs, and Compensation, in VicTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 146, at 245 (describ-
ing programs).
222 See Mike Niemeyer & David Shichor, A Preliminary Study of a Large Victim/Of-
fender Reconciliation Program, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 30, 30 (reporting that 59%
of victims and 83% of offenders participating in victim-offender mediation reported
satisfaction with the experience); Mark S. Umbreit, Information on Research Findings
Related to Uniquely Restorative Justice Interventions: Victim Offender Mediation and Family
Group Conferencing at 7-8 (Dec. 12, 1996), available at http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/
Resources/Documents/cumb96d.pdf (reporting that, in a study of victim offender
mediation programs in four U.S. states, 90% of the victims and 91% of the offenders
expressed satisfaction with the mediation outcome).
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tion with the mediation process and outcomes." 223 As yet, there is no
useful study on the impact of VOMs and VORPs on adult offenders'
recidivism.
VOMs and VORPs share two important characteristics: (1) volun-
tary participation by the victim 224 (and sometimes the defendant) and
(2) a dialogue (usually facilitated) between the victim and the defen-
dant. Victim allocution would be similar to these programs in that
participation by the victim would be voluntary.225 It would differ,
however, in that dialogue between the victim and defendant is not
anticipated and, indeed, is unlikely to be permitted. This formula
may minimize participant anxiety (and also the court's time), but it
also eliminates some of the more interactive (and arguably motiva-
tional) aspects of the VOM/VORP model. 226 Nonetheless, utilizing a
restorative justice perspective-one which forces the defendant to
"see [the victim] as [a] human being[ ] in a state of distress"22 7
-ar-
gues in favor of victim allocution.
VI. A PROPOSAL
Congress should amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(c) (3) (E) so that it would read as follows:
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE. Before imposing sentence, the court
must:
223 Charles Tracy, Editorial, The Promises and Perils of Restorative Justice, 42 INT'L. J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 275, 275-76 (1998); see also Jennifer M.
Cunha, Comment, Family Group Conferences: Healing the Wounds ofJuvenile Property Crime
in New Zealand and the United States, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 283, 330 (1999) ("Regard-
ing victims' satisfaction with VORP sessions, 79% of victims in mediation groups indi-
cate[d] satisfaction with how the system handled their case, compared with only 57%
of victim s who did not participate in mediation programs.").
224 For a discussion of the reasons why a victim might choose not to participate in
a VORP, see John Gehm, Mediated Victim-Offender Restitution Agreements: An Exploratory
Analysis of Factors Related to Victim Participation, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND
RECONCILIATION 177, 179-81 (Burt Galaway &Joe Hudson eds., 1990). For a critique
suggesting that victims often feel coerced to participate, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
The Use of Mediation To Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247,
1266-67 (1994).
225 Victim participation in sentencing is always voluntary in the sense that a victim
has no obligation to provide a written statement or to appear to testify at the sentenc-
ing hearing, even if requested to do so by the government.
226 See Robert B. Coates, Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs in North America: An
Assessment, in CRIMINALJUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 224, at
125, 132 (arguing that eliminating the face-to-face aspect of VORP is unwise and does
not serve the goal of humanizing the parties to a crime).
227 Fattah, supra note 163, at 270.
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(E) in any felony case address the victim personally if the victim is
present at the sentencing hearing and determine if the victim
wishes to make a statement or present any information in relation
to the sentence.
Where the felony involves multiple victims, the court may limit the
number of victims permitted to testify. Questions as to whether a
person is a "victim" in any particular case shall be resolved by the
sentencing judge and shall not be reviewable.
This proposal recognizes that there must be some limits to victim
allocution, both in terms of the types of crimes to which it will apply
(felonies) and the amount of time that a court must devote to it. It
also recognizes that some types of felonies (like securities fraud or
identity theft) have direct and identifiable victims whose testimony is
both relevant (as determined by the Sentencing Guidelines) and use-
ful to the judge's sentencing determination. Other types of felonies
(like money laundering, drug trafficking, or bribery of a public offi-
cial) may have indirect and less identifiable victims whose stories of
victimization and loss, though genuine, may not be relevant to the
sentencing process. 228 I leave the making of such distinctions to the
sentencing judge in the first instance 229 and, by making those judg-
ments unreviewable, I minimize the amount of collateral litigation
that will arise.
This proposal carves out some politically safe space between those
critics who oppose broad victims' rights accommodations as unduly
burdensome on prosecutors and the judicial system 230 and those vic-
tims' rights advocates who favor such accommodations regardless of
the nature or gravity of the crimes involved.23 ' By limiting the protec-
228 Richard Wiebe categorizes crimes as those (such as fraud) for which there are
'specific, readily ascertainable victims," those (such as espionage) in which victims are
difficult to identify, and those (such as public drunkenness) that are victimless. Rich-
ard P. XViebe, The Mental Health Implications of Crime Victims' Rights, in LAw, MENTAL
HEALTH, AND MErAL DISORDER 414, 415-16 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman
eds., 1996). Though I do not share Wiebe's categorization of public drunkenness, I
do agree that some crimes result in abstract and collective, rather than specific and
personal, victimization.
229 Congress, of course, has the right to define more specifically which crimes
would entitle victims to make allocution, and the circumstances in which even indi-
rect victims should be given the right to testify. Thus, Congress could determine that
local community leaders are appropriate victim witnesses in drug trafficking or public
corruption cases or that representatives of consumer organizations are appropriate
victim witnesses in antitrust cases.
230 This was an objection of many state and federal prosecutors to early versions of
the victims' rights constitutional amendment. See Eaton, supra note 5.
231 The National Victim Center has taken this position and opposed the proposed
federal Victims' Rights Amendment because it failed to protect victims of non-violent
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tions of the proposed rule to victims of federal felonies and by making
clear that not all victims of felonies can be afforded the right to allocu-
tion in every case, this proposal plugs a hole in Rule 32(c) (3) (E) that
has deprived victims of economic crimes of important procedural
rights, but does so without having to rewrite the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Over the last fifteen years, we have developed useful experience
with victims' rights legislation.23 2 The victims' services profession has
become over that period a true profession with standards, best prac-
tices, and a track record of achievement. It is time to move beyond
the initial stages of victim empowerment as represented by the current
version of Rule 32(c) (3) (E) and amend the Rule so as to include non-
violent crime victims. Doing so is the best way to recognize that vic-
tims of economic crimes, like victims of violent crimes, may suffer sig-
nificantly as a result of the crime and ought to be heard in the federal
sentencing process. o
crimes. See Nat'l Center for Victims of Crime, The National Center for Victims of Crime
Does Not Support SJR 3, at http://www.ncvc.org/Iaw/Nvc-ca.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2001).
232 See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen
Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CrIM. & Crv.
CONFINEMENT 21, 32-38, 103-05 (1999).
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